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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper serves to analyse social media misconduct in the workplace. The 
introduction of electronic and social media has brought about significant changes to 
how business is conducted. Despite its widespread benefits, social media usage has 
the potential to cause harm to a business entity.  
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the different forms of harm that may befall 
a business through social media misuse, and the tools that are available and the 
steps that need to be taken to avert such harm.  
 
The analysis will be undertaken by referring to South African legislative and common 
law principles and by drawing a comparison with the approach adopted by foreign 
jurisdictions in respect of social media misconduct in their workplaces.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Humans are social animals, and they have a need to communicate with each other. 
Social media allows people to communicate with each other through the medium that 
they prefer.1 
 
Communication has evolved from writing letters, sent via the postal service, to the 
use of the internet where communication occurs instantly. Businesses were quick to 
see the benefits of social media and began using it in the promotion of their goods 
and services, and to connect with existing and potential customers. Today it is 
commonplace to find, on the websites of businesses and in their advertising material, 
the inclusion of their Facebook and Twitter accounts. 
 
It was inevitable, with the popularity and widespread use of social media, both by 
individuals and business entities alike, that conflicts would arise. One form of conflict 
that has arisen, and which is the subject matter of this analysis, is social media 
misconduct in the workplace. 
 
Social media misconduct, which is rooted in interpersonal conflict, enters the public 
domain through human communications. Conflicts may have arisen from individual 
judgements of fairness in social exchanges, the consequent reactions to perceived 
unfairness, and the tactics that are chosen to deal with the perceived injustices.   
 
1.2 Background  
There is little dispute that social media has proved to be enormously beneficial, both 
for individuals and business entities alike. However, the benefits brought about by 
social media are counterbalanced, at times, by the negative attitudes of social media 
users. Social media used to harass and bully, promote pornography, commit fraud, 
post racist and sexist comments, and take part in similar anti-social conduct, is the 
                                            
1 B Hale ‘The history of social media: social networking revolution’ (2015) History Co-operative at page 
6. 
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stark reality of our times.2 The workplace has not been left unscathed by the negative 
repercussions of social media misconduct. 
 
Van Jaarsveld observes that the negative attributes of electronic and social media, 
in the workplace, are numerous: it may result in reduced productivity where 
employees occupy themselves with updating their social media profiles, instead of 
working. Employees may expend work time downloading music and video recordings 
and engaging in other online activity, thereby, reducing the employer’s bandwidth, 
and adding to costs; the possibility of viruses infecting workplace systems as a result 
of non-work-related employee activities; employees visiting pornographic sites; 
employees posting defamatory comments, regarding co-workers or management; 
employees posting confidential information on their web profiles.3 
 
Conversely, employees may claim infringement of their privacy rights where 
employers unlawfully view their private communications, or where employers use 
data extracted from employees’ private web profiles to make decisions relating to 
recruitment and remuneration. 
 
The laws relating to social media misconduct in the workplace are in their infancy. 
The reason being that social media, in its present form, was unheard of until just over 
a decade ago. Courts have, however, in numerous instances, pronounced on social 
media misconduct in the workplace. 
 
This submission is an analysis of social media misconduct in the workplace. Included 
in this analysis will be an assessment of legislation, both nationally and 
internationally; the impact of social media misconduct on organisations; and how 
social media misconduct cases have been decided in South Africa and foreign legal 
jurisdictions. The analysis will conclude with a section on the lessons learnt, and 
recommendations for the future.    
 
 
                                            
2 M Van Jaarsveld ‘Forewarned is forearmed: some thoughts on the inappropriate use of computers 
in the workplace’ (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 651,666. 
3 Ibid 651. 
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1.3 Research questions 
This dissertation is aimed, foremost, at analysing the impact of social media 
misconduct in the South African workplace. A proper and comprehensive analysis 
will require, in addition, that attention be paid to the different sub-components of the 
research topic. These include:  
1.3.1 What laws have been enacted, to counteract the negative effects of social 
media misconduct? 
1.3.2 What are the types of misconduct that could occur in the workplace?  
1.3.3 What is the impact, on a business entity, of social media misconduct? 
1.3.4 How is the problem of social media misconduct handled in foreign 
jurisdictions?  
1.3.5 What lessons can be learnt? 
 
1.4 Objectives: 
The objectives of this dissertation are: 
1.4.1 To identify and analyse the laws that have been enacted to counteract the 
negative effects of social media misconduct. 
1.4.2 To investigate the types of social media misconduct that could occur in a 
business organisation, and the potential effects on both employers and 
employees. 
1.4.3 To analyse the impact of social media misconduct on a business entity. 
1.4.4 To determine how social media misconduct is handled in foreign jurisdictions. 
In this section, there will be an examination of the legislation and important 
court decisions of the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. This 
section will highlight the similarities, and differences, in respect of South 
Africa’s approach to workplace social media misconduct, in comparison to that 
adopted by other countries. 
1.4.5 To identify lessons that can be adopted in South Africa. 
 
1.5 Research methodology: 
The research methodology used for the submission is desk-based. It involves an 
analysis of literature from various sources, originating both nationally and globally, 
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and includes journal articles, books, and case law. The material is considered within 
the constitutional and legal framework of South Africa.  
 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation: 
This dissertation is discussed in seven chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the subject. It contains a broad description of 
social media, the aim of the study, and the research methodology used. 
 
Chapter 2 examines, in brief, the social and psychological factors that underpin 
human behaviour. The conduct of employers and employees in the workplace do not 
occur in isolation, their conduct is influenced significantly by factors that are unrelated 
to the workplace, and these factors are considered. The chapter thereafter explains 
social networking services and social media usage, in broad society and in the 
workplace, while always being cognisant of the social and psychological factors that 
direct human behaviour.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the three fundamental rights that are most often at issue when 
social media misconduct occurs in the workplace. These are the rights to dignity, 
privacy and freedom of expression. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the risks that are posed to the employer consequent to 
employees’ misuse of social media.   
 
Chapter 5 examines foreign law as it applies to social media usage in the workplace. 
This chapter analyses legislation and the decisions of courts in the USA, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses social media misconduct in the South African workplace and 
includes an assessment of the applicable laws and decided cases. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and provides recommendations on how best to 
address the matter of social media misconduct in the workplace. 
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Chapter 2 
Social and psychological factors that influence human behaviour 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Astute employee relations practitioners are required to be aware, especially in South 
Africa with its troubled history of legislated racial discrimination and inequality, of the 
diverse nature of their workforce. They need to be aware that employees and 
employers differ from each other in significant areas. These include differences 
based on gender, class, race, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, social 
upbringing, levels of education and other factors. The workplace is a microcosm of 
broad society; therefore, societal conflicts and tensions are carried into the workplace 
on a daily basis and may emerge as contributory factors to social media misconduct 
within the workplace. Employers must be conscious of these tensions and must pro-
actively take steps to avoid having these tensions turn into workplace misconduct, 
including social media misconduct. 
 
In this chapter, consideration will be given to the underlying causes of social media 
misconduct in the workplace and the tools that are most often utilised, by employers 
and employees, to engage in social media misconduct.        
 
2.2 Understanding the ‘social’ in social media 
“Social psychology is the scientific field that seeks to understand the nature and 
causes of individual behaviour in social situations.”4 The subject is vast and includes 
social perception, social cognition, attitude formation, prejudice and discrimination, 
social influence, aggression, group and individual behaviour, environmental influence 
on behaviour, and personality.5 Space constraints prevent a comprehensive 
discussion of the subject, and only certain key elements will be highlighted.  
 
The central idea of the behaviourist school of psychology is that individual behaviour 
is shaped by two factors: genetics, and the environment. The founder of the 
behaviourist school is John Watson, who stated: “Give me a dozen healthy infants, 
                                            
4 R Baron & D Byrne Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction 5 ed (1987) at page 11). 
5 Ibid 12. 
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well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take 
any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – 
doctor, lawyer, merchant, chef, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of 
his talents, penchants, abilities, vocation, and the race of his ancestors.”6 The 
essence of Watson’s argument is that our behaviours, to a large extent, are shaped 
by our environment. It follows, therefore, that nationalism, racism, gender superiority 
and prejudice7 are learned (not genetically acquired) behaviours. 
 
Baron and Byrne have noted that there is a range of individual maladaptive 
behaviours8 – these include stress and adjustment disorders, anxiety-based 
disorders, personality disorders, mood disorders, delusional disorders, substance 
abuse and other addictive disorders, sexual disorders and variants, and organic 
mental disorders and mental retardation.9 Suffice it to say that every human is 
inflicted, to a lesser or greater extent, with one form of a psychological disorder or 
another. 
 
In summary, when employees and employers enter the workplace and interact with 
each other continuously for the greater part of the day, there must be an awareness 
that the public personas presented in the workplace are hugely influenced by social 
and psychological factors outside of the office or factory floor.  
 
The individual, who, for example, posts derogatory comments about other race or 
religious groups within the workplace community, is almost certainly giving vent to 
values, beliefs and learned behaviours acquired from membership of communities 
outside of the workplace. Employers must be cognisant of the internalised non-work-
related tensions that may give rise to social media misconduct. Cilliers has correctly 
stated that “social media is about sociology, not technology.”10 
 
 
                                            
6 PH Mussen...et al. Child Development and Personality (1990) 6 ed at page 16 
7 Baron & Byrne (note 4 above; 151) “An attitude, usually negative, towards members of some group 
based solely on their membership in that group”. 
8 Baron & Byrne (note 4 above). 
9 Ibid. 
10 F Q Cilliers ‘The role and effect of social media in the workplace’ (2013) 40(3) Northern Kentucky 
Law Review. 
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2.3 Understanding social network services and social media   
Advances in technology in recent years have led to significant changes in the way 
individuals communicate, relay information and share knowledge. This is evident 
through the widespread use of technological devices such as smartphones and 
tablets, as well as through discussions on social media networks such as Facebook 
and Twitter. While many of these devices originated as entertainment, their 
prevalence in daily life has led to their increased usage in the employment setting – 
companies have taken advantage of these social media platforms both externally, to 
advertise, and internally, to expand knowledge sharing. 11 
 
There are several definitions of a social networking service (hereafter referred to as 
SNS) and social media. Boyd and Ellison12 define SNS’s as “web-based services that 
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded 
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) 
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to 
site”.   
 
Social networking sites impact people of varying ages and of various professional 
persuasions, both in the developed and non-developed world, and have quickly 
gained acceptance and use in education, research, the corporate world, government, 
politics, professional practice, and in general society.13  
 
The enormity of the power of social media and social networking services are 
discussed by Mutula:14 “It is instructive that the political revolution in North Africa that 
overthrew the regimes of Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hussein Mubarak of Egypt and 
Muammar Kaddafi of Libya were orchestrated through social networks, by young 
people using mainly Twitter and Facebook, to mobilise the masses.” 
 
                                            
11 J Ireton ‘Social Media: What control do employers have over employee social media Activity in the 
workplace’ (2014) 14 Houston Business and Tax Law Journal.  
12 D Boyd & N Ellison ‘Social network sites: definition, history, and scholarship’ (2007) Journal of 
Computer Mediated Communication”. 
13 SM Mutula ‘Policy gaps and technological deficiencies in social networking environments: 
implications for information sharing’ (2013) 15(1) SA Journal of Information Management (page 1). 
14 Ibid 6. 
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The power of social media and social networking services are as important in the 
workplace context. Aside from its positive attributes and the goodwill that it can 
generate, social media allows disgruntled employees to publicise their views to an 
unlimited number of recipients and, in the process, may cause significant reputational 
damage to an organisation.  
 
2.4 Types of social networks 
Mutula describes five types of social networks – these are personal networks, status 
update networks, location networks, content sharing networks, and shared interest 
networks.15 
 
Personal networks allow users to create detailed online profiles and connect with 
other users with the emphasis being on social relationships. The best-known example 
is Facebook.16 Anyone with an email account may set up a Facebook account. Users 
set their privacy settings at different levels. At the least restrictive public level, all two 
billion Facebook users can view what is on a user’s account, and at an intermediate 
level, only the user’s friends can view the content. Facebook allows users to 
customize their privacy settings.17 
 
Facebook users create a profile on the site, and they may include information such 
as their age, political and religious affiliation, employment or campus information and 
pictures of family.18 The user adds ‘contacts’ to build social relationships. Messages 
may be “posted on a user’s wall, and everyone listed as a contact is able to view the 
messages.”19 
  
Facebook subscribers can gain access to other users’ profiles depending on the 
privacy levels set up by the latter. Facebook’s policies state that privacy settings are 
not fool-proof and, further, that Facebook has no means of verifying the honesty, 
reliability or accuracy of information uploaded to their site by users.20 
                                            
15 Ibid 3. 
16 Heroldt v Wills 2014 JOL 31479 (GSJ). 
17 Heroldt supra at para 10. 
18 Heroldt supra at para 12. 
19 Heroldt supra at para 15. 
20 Heroldt supra at para 18. 
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Status update social networks are designed to allow the users to post short status 
updates to communicate with other users quickly. Twitter is the best-known example. 
Twitter is an information sharing or micro-blogging site. Subscribers tweet their 
messages and share information with their followers, and these messages are 
publicly visible by default.21 
 
Google Latitude is an example of a location network, and it allows the public or 
authorised contacts to view the user’s real-time location.22 
  
Content sharing networks allow for the sharing of verbal and text-based exchanges, 
music, photographs, and videos. YouTube is the best example in this sub-category.  
Shared interest networks, such as Linked-in, are built around the common interests 
of specific groups of people.23 
 
Facebook is the most popular social networking site in South Africa, and in most of 
the countries of the world.24 It was launched in 2003 by Harvard student Mark 
Zuckerberg.25 The number of Facebook users, on June 30th, 2017, consisted of 1.98 
billion subscribers. In the context of a world population of 7.51 billion people, 26.3% 
of the people on the planet use Facebook. In the period 2010 to 2017, Facebook 
subscribers increased by 282%.26 
 
Statistics provided by Omnicore27 are illustrative of the popularity of social media. As 
at 1st January 2018, the number of Facebook users was recorded at 2.07 billion 
persons, the number of active Twitter users was 330 million persons, Linked-in had 
500 million active users, and YouTube had an impressive 1.57 billion active users.28   
 
 
 
                                            
21 Heroldt supra at para 22. 
22 Mutula (note 13 above). 
23 Mutula (note 13 above). 
24 Mutula (note 13 above).  
25 Heroldt supra at para 14. 
 26Miniwatts Marketing Group: Internet World Stats(2017)available at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com, accessed on 12 November 2017. 
27 Omnicore Group (2018) available at http://www.omnicoreagency.com, accessed on 5 March 2018. 
28 Ibid. 
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2.5 Summary:   
The discussion above illustrates the popularity of social media, and its ability to allow 
the user to disseminate his or her message to a global audience. It was noted that 
social media is available to virtually everyone, both to those with benevolent or 
malevolent intentions. 
 
In their roles as employers and employees, the players do not perform as 
automations. They are influenced, in everything that they do, by the sum of their life 
experiences that have shaped, throughout their lives, their characters and beliefs. 
Racial and gender superiority, nationalism, the effect of family violence and similar 
attributes lie within the individual, at a subliminal level, and is triggered, and surfaces, 
when a stress-inducing occurrence presents itself. Very often, in such moments, the 
individual turns to the use of a powerful weapon in his armoury: social media. 
 
In the remaining chapters, the focus will narrow, and the attention will shift gradually 
to social media misconduct in the workplace.  
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Chapter 3  
Dignity, privacy, freedom of expression 
  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of three rights contained in the Bill of Rights, which 
often feature in disputes relating to social media misconduct in the workplace. These 
are the rights to dignity, privacy and freedom of expression. These rights will be 
discussed broadly. In the chapters that follow, it will be shown how the rights apply 
within the narrower field of labour law.   
 
3.2 Dignity 
The history of humankind abounds with unimaginable atrocities inflicted by human 
beings on fellow beings. In what is the present age of enlightenment and 
technological progress, the dark side of the human spirit is as prevalent today as at 
any time in the world’s history. Wars continue but with technologically advanced 
weapons, slavery exists in the form of modern-day human trafficking, corporate greed 
for profit results in a high incidence of child labour and poor work conditions, medical 
care is denied to vast numbers of people as pharmaceutical companies refuse to 
relinquish patent rights and sell medicines at inflated prices. The resultant effect is 
that the dignity of a significant number of persons is compromised. 
 
Assaults on dignity occur, both overtly and covertly, in the workplace. It is not 
uncommon for employees to be singled out and unfairly discriminated against, on 
diverse grounds including race,29 religion,30 gender,31 sexual orientation32 or 
disability.33 Social media is a tool that is often used to infringe on the dignity of fellow 
employees. Examples of such conduct include disparaging posts about a fellow 
employee’s race, religion or sexual orientation or creating a hostile work environment 
by viewing or disseminating pornographic material during work hours.  
 
                                            
29 Govender v Mondi Kraft-Richards Bay 1999 (20) ILJ 2881(LC). 
30 Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi & Others 2014 (35) ILJ 406(SCA). 
31 Ekhamanzi Springs (Pty) Ltd v Mnomiya 2014 (35) ILJ 2388 (LAC). 
32 Ehlers v Bohler Uddeholm Africa (Pty) Ltd 2010 (31) ILJ 2383 (LC). 
33 IMATU & Another v City of Cape Town 2005 (26) ILJ 1404 (LC). 
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An individual’s dignity rights are recognised in several provisions of South Africa’s 
Constitution.     
 
The Constitution34 states, in section 1 of its founding provisions, that “the Republic of 
South Africa is one sovereign, democratic state, founded on the following values: 
Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedom…” 
 
In Section 7(1) it is provided that “this Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
 
Section 10 provides that “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.” The importance of human dignity prompted the 
Constitutional Court to describe the right to dignity and the right to life as the most 
important human rights.”35 In S v Makwanyane,36 the Constitutional Court stated: 
“recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human 
beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. 
This right, therefore, is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically 
entrenched in…. the Bill of Rights.” 
 
The Constitutional Court went further, in S v Makhwanye, to state that: “The rights to 
life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other 
personal rights in the Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a society founded on 
the recognition of human rights, we are required to value these two rights above all 
others.”37 
 
“Human dignity is that which gives a person their intrinsic worth, therefore, dignity is 
above all price and so admits of no equivalent.”38 It is the source of a person’s innate 
rights to freedom and physical integrity, from which several other rights flow. Human 
                                            
34 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
35 J De Waal,,I Currie & G Erasmus.The Bill of Rights Handbook 3 ed (2000) . 
36 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
37 Ibid – see also J De Waal, I Currie & G Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 3 ed (2000) 209. 
38 Ibid 209 where the authors quote from B Jones article “Kant’s Principle of Personality“. 
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dignity accordingly also provides the basis for the right to equality since every person 
possesses human dignity in equal measure, everyone must be treated as equally 
worthy of respect.39  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a document held to be the 
bedrock of human rights law and reads:  
 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world ……. Now, therefore, the General Assembly proclaims the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations ….”40 
 
The UDHR resulted from the experiences of the Second World War where the 
international community vowed never again to allow atrocities like those of that 
conflict to occur again.41 
 
Human dignity has come to display three elements in the post-war legal context. 
Human beings have an equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or 
diminished; inherent human dignity must be recognised and respected; states have 
a positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the mechanism 
of socio-economic rights.42 
 
According to Steinmann, it is widely accepted that the elements have their root in 
Kantian moral ethics, which hold that man’s autonomy is based upon universal 
dignity, because of which man should never be used as a means to an end, but only 
as a means in himself.43 
 
Inherent dignity comprises the totality of the uniqueness of a human being’s nature, 
his intelligence and his sensibilities. Implicit in the inherent claim of dignity is the 
                                            
39 De Waal (note 35 above).  
40 Proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10th December 1948, GA Resolution 217 A. 
41 History of the Document available at http://www.un.org, accessed on 6 March 2018. 
42 R Steinmann, R ‘The core meaning of human dignity’ (2016) 19 PER /PELJ. 
43 Ibid. 
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acknowledgement and acceptance of diversity and differences in human beings and 
cultures.44 
 
The concept of dignity featured prominently in the Stransham-Ford v Minister of 
Justice and Correctional Services45 decision where, in a case relating to assisted 
suicide, Justice Fabricius spoke of how the effects of “unbearable and interminable 
suffering infringe on the categorical imperative of section 10 of the Bill of Rights”.  
 
The interpretation of dignity is not inherently and universally accepted but is often a 
social construct which may conflict with others’ understanding of dignity. In MEC for 
Education: KZN v Pillay,46 the Constitutional Court emphasised that “human dignity 
encompasses the unique set of ends of each individual, so that a Hindu female 
learner may wear a nose stud in school as an expression of her South Indian Tamil 
Hindu culture.”47 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs and others v Watchenuka48 the SCA stated “human dignity 
has no nationality. It is inherent in all people – citizens and non-citizens alike – simply 
because they are human.” The SCA stated further, “the inherent dignity of all people 
– like human life itself – is one of the foundational values of the Bill of Rights. It 
constitutes the basis and inspiration for the recognition that is given to other more 
specific protections that are afforded by the Bill of Rights.”49 
 
The impairment of employers’ and employees’ rights to dignity in the workplace, 
resulting from social media usage, is a frequently occurring global phenomenon. 
Bullying, disseminating sexually explicit material, harassment, racism and sexism are 
a few examples of social media misconduct in the workplace that may have the effect 
of infringing on one’s right to dignity.   
 
 
                                            
44 Ibid. 
45 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice & Correctional Services 2015 (4) SA (GP). 
46 MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Minister of Home Affairs and others v Watchenuka (2003) ZASCA 142 at para 25. 
49 Ibid at para 26. 
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3.3 Privacy 
In South Africa, privacy protection is derived from several sources, “the three major 
tributaries being the common or civil law (usually the law of delict or tort), a Bill of 
Rights, and legislation.50 These streams do not flow independently, and, in fact, their 
confluence increases the potential power of the protection of privacy. The right to 
privacy is a guaranteed right and this right, together with the inherent right to dignity, 
contributes to humanity.”51 
 
However, a balance needs to be found between respect for a person’s private 
spheres, and the involvement of others in individual lives. People are fully human, 
not only through engagement with others but also where others show respect for their 
private domain. The African concept of ‘Ubuntu’ highlights a spirit of 
interconnectedness, or collectivity, rather than individual privacy.52 
 
Neethling53 views privacy as “an individual condition of life characterised by isolation 
from the public and publicity.” This means an absence of acquaintance with the 
individual or his personal affairs, therefore, privacy is infringed by an unauthorised 
acquaintance by outsiders with the individual or his personal affairs.54 
 
Section 14 of the Constitution reads “Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall 
include the right not to have – (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property 
searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications 
infringed.”55 Section 14 has two parts – “the first guarantees a general right to privacy, 
and the second protects against specific infringements of privacy, namely searches 
and seizures and infringements of the privacy of communications.”56 Protection 
“against searches and seizures is a subordinate element of the right to privacy,” 
therefore, in addition to the search, seizure or interception of a communication, there 
                                            
50 J Burchell ‘The legal protection of privacy in south africa: a transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13(1) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 J Neethling, J M Potgieter & P J Visser Law of Delict (1st ed) (1990) at 294. 
54 Ibid at 294. 
55 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
56 De Waal (note 35 above). 
23 
 
must also be an infringement of the general privacy right for constitutional protection 
to be invoked.  
 
The common law recognises the right to privacy as an independent personality right 
– breach of a person’s privacy constitutes an iniuria.57 In Financial Mail v Sage 
Holdings,58 the court stated: “there is a public interest in preserving confidentiality in 
regard to private affairs and in discouraging the leaking of private and confidential 
information, unlawfully obtained, to the media (and others).”  
 
In Bernstein v Bester NO,59 the court cautioned against a straightforward use of 
common law principles to interpret fundamental rights, and the limitations thereof, in 
the following words:  
 
 “Caution must be exercised when attempting to project common law principles onto 
the interpretation of fundamental rights and their limitation; it is important to keep in 
mind that at common law the determination of whether an invasion of privacy has 
taken place constitutes a single enquiry, including an assessment of its unlawfulness 
…. In constitutional adjudication under the Constitution, by contrast, a two-stage 
approach must be utilised ….”  
 
The scope of a person’s privacy extends only to aspects of his or her life or conduct 
regarding which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be harboured.60 A legitimate 
expectation is one that, though there exists a subjective expectation of privacy, 
society nonetheless considers it (objectively) reasonable. The court in Bernstein61 
stated:  
 
“The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to 
another citizen. In the context of privacy, this would mean that it is only the inner 
sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home 
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. 
                                            
57 Ibid 243. 
58 Financial Mail v Sage Holdings 1993 (2) SA 451(A). 
59 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
60 Bernstein supra. 
61 Bernstein supra at para 67. 
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This implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a 
corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of 
individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is 
acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal 
relations, and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal 
space shrinks accordingly.” 
 
In respect of business undertakings, it was held in Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental 
Council of South Africa62 that the more public the undertaking and the more closely 
regulated, the more attenuated the right to privacy would be and the less intense any 
possible invasion. The greater the potential hazards that a business poses to the 
public, the less an inspection of the business can be considered an invasion of 
privacy.63 
 
The aspect of privacy which relates to the right to be left alone has been considered 
in several court decisions. Case v Minister of Safety and Security64 related to a 
challenge of the “Indecent or Obscene Photographic Materials Act 37 of 1967” where 
the court found that it was an unjustifiable invasion of privacy to prohibit possession 
of pornography in the privacy of one’s home and the offending section was declared 
unconstitutional and invalid. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the right to personal use of erotic material in the privacy 
of the home may be limited where, for example, the material consists of child 
pornography. In such instances, possession and use may be prohibited, even if it 
occurs in the privacy of one’s home.65 
 
In the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,66 the 
Constitutional Court considered the constitutional validity of the common law offence 
of sodomy and the statutory provisions based on the offence. The court considered 
the matter not only in respect of the right for someone not to be subject to 
                                            
62 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC).  
63 De Waal (note 35 above). 
64 Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC). 
65 De Waal (note 35 above; 248). 
66 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).  
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discrimination based on his or her sexual orientation but also in terms of the rights to 
privacy and dignity. The court found that the criminalisation of sodomy infringed on 
the individual’s right to self-realisation that is contained within one’s privacy rights.   
 
Informational privacy is directed at the protection of human dignity, it guarantees the 
right of a person to have control over the use of private information.67 It relates to any 
private information, and not only information that causes damage to one’s dignity or 
has the potential to cause embarrassment. 
 
Privacy rights include a person’s right not to have his or her home or property 
searched. The meanings attached to the words property and possessions, and when 
a regulatory inspection of business premises becomes a search, needs to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. In general, searches and seizures that invade 
privacy must be conducted in terms of legislation clearly defining the power to search 
and seize. They are only permissible to achieve compelling public objectives and, 
where searches and seizures violate the right to privacy, these must be authorised 
by a warrant. Several laws authorise searches and seizures, the most important of 
which is the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.68  
 
It follows, therefore, after having considered the above, that privacy rights are held to 
be extremely important in South Africa and in progressive countries throughout the 
world. 
 
Infringements of privacy rights may occur in the workplace through social media use, 
and the question that is often found to be perplexing is how to balance the privacy 
expectations of employees against employers’ rights to monitor and regulate the 
communications of workers. The rights to privacy of employees are not extinguished 
on their signing of employment contracts. Conversely, the employer has the right to 
manage their employees’ activities and take steps to prevent harm that may be 
caused to the business through the activities of employees. The next chapter will 
consider the reasons that may justify an employer’s monitoring of employee social 
                                            
67  De Waal (note 35 above; 250). 
68  De Waal (note 35 above). 
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media conduct, and the subsequent two chapters will analyse the legal mechanisms 
that allow employers, in given circumstances, to intrude on employees’ privacy rights.    
 
3.4 Freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is expressly provided for in “Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.”69 “Article 19 of the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights” also expressly provides for freedom of expression.70  In the South 
African context, section 1671 of the Constitution provides for the freedom of 
expression.  
 
There are three main reasons72 for giving constitutional protection to freedom of 
expression. Firstly, to speak or otherwise express oneself is a natural and essential 
part of human activity and serves as the fulfilment of one’s personality. Secondly, 
freedom of expression allows for scientific, artistic, or cultural progress. Such 
progress would be impossible if people were not free to express their ideas and 
discoveries. Finally, the Constitutional Court stated in South African National Defence 
Force Union v Minister of Defence,73 “freedom of expression is one of a web of 
mutually supporting rights in the Constitution and is closely related to section 15 
(freedom of religion), section 10 (dignity), section 18 (freedom of association), the 
right to vote (section 19), and the right to assembly (section 17).” 
 
                                            
69Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4th November 1950. 
70 Article 19 reads “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”  
71 “S16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes   
 freedom of the press and other media;  
 freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;  
 freedom of artistic creativity; and  
 academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.  
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to   
 propaganda for war;  
 incitement of imminent violence; or  
 advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm”. 
72 De Waal (note 35 above; 282). 
73 South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC). 
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There is a need to curtail the scope of freedom of expression, and this is evident in 
section 16(2)(c). This provision excludes “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion.”74 
 
Defamation is frequently an issue within the context of freedom of expression. 
Defamation is the wrongful and intentional publication of words or behaviour 
concerning another person which has the effect of injuring his status, good name or 
reputation.75 Grounds for justification, in respect of the purported defamation, are 
privilege, fair comment, truth and public interest.76  
 
Freedom of expression was considered in several South African court decisions. In 
Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority,77 the Constitutional 
Court considered the possibility that exercising the freedom of expression may impair 
the enjoyment of other rights, and of the necessity, at times, to limit the exercise of 
the freedom by applying the provisions of section 36(1) of the Constitution.78 In 
Heroldt v Wills,79 the court stated that “resolving the tensions between every human 
being’s constitutionally enshrined rights both to freedom of expression and to dignitas 
is all about balance ….. need to take into account the context in which a publication 
occurs.”  
 
In Dutch Reformed Church v Rayan Sookunan t/a Glory Divine World Ministries,80 
the court stated: 
 
‘Expression may often be robust, angry, vitriolic, and even abusive. One has to test 
the boundaries of freedom of expression each time. The court must be alive to the 
issues involved, the context in which the debate takes place, the protagonists to the 
dispute or agreement, the language used as well as the content of which is said, 
written and published and about whom it is published.”81 
                                            
74 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of1996. 
75 Burchell (note 50 above). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC). 
78 Islamic Unity Convention supra at para 30. 
79 Heroldt supra. 
80 Dutch Reformed Church v Rayan Sookunan t/a Glory Divine World Ministries 2012 (3) All SA 322 
(GSJ).  
81 Dutch Reformed Church supra at para 23. 
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Social media is a tool that is readily available, in society and in the workplace, which 
allows individuals to exercise their right to freely express themselves. However, 
granting employees uninhibited rights to express their views on social media may 
pose a great risk to the employer. The risks posed by social media misconduct will 
be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
3.5 Summary:  
The matter of ‘context’ is a recurring theme in the decisions of the courts, and an 
attempt has been made to follow a similar pattern in this submission. The broad 
issues of sociology and psychology that underpin human behaviour were initially 
considered. The focus narrowed and the rights which are most often in dispute, in 
respect of social media misconduct in the workplace, were then discussed. These 
were the rights to dignity, privacy and freedom of expression. 
 
In the remaining chapters, the focus will narrow further, and the discussion will relate 
to matters exclusive to the workplace. In the next chapter, the discussion will relate 
to the risks posed to an employer as a result of employees’ social media misconduct.  
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Chapter 4:  
Risks to the employer arising from social media misconduct 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The introduction of electronic communication tools into the workplace has changed 
the way that business is conducted. These tools provide an easy channel of 
communication and of access to information, but they also increase exposure to legal 
risks. As a result, employers may choose to increase the level of workplace 
monitoring, thus threatening an employee’s privacy.82  
 
Given that many people spend half (or more) of their waking lives at work, it is 
inevitable, that in utilising social media to share information about their personal lives, 
people will share information about their work lives as well.83 
 
The increase in work outside the office has further blurred the boundary between 
work and home, public and private.84 
 
In a survey of South African companies, 69% had experienced employees ‘loafing’ 
on the internet, 70% found employees accessing or sending discriminatory or 
sexually offensive jokes or pictures, and 15% cited incidents where employees 
violated copyright laws or posted defamatory material using the employer’s computer 
resources.85 
 
The employment relationship is characterised by an implied “duty of good faith, by 
the employee towards the employer.”86 An employee’s duty to “act in good faith 
towards his or her employer is recognised as an implied term of an employment 
contract.”87 
                                            
82 D Collier ‘Workplace privacy in the cyber age’ (2002) 23 ILJ 1743. 
83 G Pike ‘Social media and the workplace’ (2014) 31(9) Information Today . 
84 J Cavico ‘Social media and employment at will: tort law and practical considerations for employees, 
managers and organizations’ (2013) 11 New Media and Mass Communication.  
85L Dancaster, ‘Internet abuse: a survey of South African companies’ (2001) 22 ILJ 862,872. 
86 Van Jaarsveld (note 2 above). 
87 Sappi Novobord (Pty) Ltd v Bolleurs 1998 (19) ILJ 784 (LAC) where the court stated “It is an implied 
term of the contract of employment that the employee will act with good faith towards his employer 
and that he will serve his employer honestly and faithfully ….”.  
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A further aspect of the duty of good faith is that an employer enjoys the right to 
exercise control over the employee’s activities during working hours; as such, an 
employee must show respect to his employer, and an employee must be obedient to 
his or her employer.88 
 
Employee disrespect and/or disobedience may cause prejudice to the employer. The 
potential risks to the employer, arising from social media misconduct by employees, 
will now be investigated. 
 
4.2 Vicarious liability 
Employers being held vicariously liable for the conduct of employees may arise in 
several ways. These include employee acts of harassment, discrimination, 
defamatory statements, copyright infringements, and from unauthorised contract 
formation, all of which may arise from social media and electronic mail use.89 The 
type of liability imposed on the employer depends on the type of employee 
misconduct, and the employer’s liability may arise from criminal or civil proceedings. 
Criminal liability may arise where, for instance, employees view or are in possession 
of child pornography in the workplace in violation of the Film and Publications Board 
Act No 65 of 1996.  
 
A company’s employees are considered as insiders. In terms of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, a company may be held liable for the acts or conduct of employees 
performed within the scope of their employment.90 Historically, a company’s own 
employees (or insiders) have been responsible for most of the security breaches, yet 
companies hold onto the outdated belief that the external threat is much more 
significant than the internal threat.91 
 
The general rule in South Africa is that when a delict is committed, the perpetrator of 
the delict is personally liable for the loss arising from the wrongful conduct. With 
vicarious liability, however, another party may be held liable for the delict of the 
                                            
88 Van Jaarsveld (note 2 above; 654). 
89 V Etsebeth ‘The growing expansion of vicarious liability in the information age (Part 1)’ (2006) 
Journal of South African Law 564-565. 
90 Ibid 564 & 580.  
91 Ibid 566.  
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perpetrator that has caused loss to another party.92 Liability, in this form, is called 
strict liability, or liability without fault.93 Vicarious liability arises when there is a 
relationship between two persons, for example, a principal/agent relationship. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the employer and employee relationship is the focus. 
 
The principle whereby an employer may be held jointly and severally liable, with an 
employee, for the employee’s wrongful acts committed in the course and scope of 
the employee’s employment, was first expressed in the Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 
case94 wherein it was held:  
 
‘a master who does his work by the hand of a servant creates a risk of harm to others 
if the servant should prove to be negligent or inefficient or untrustworthy…. if the 
servant’s acts in doing his master’s work or his activities are incidental to or connected 
with it are carried out in a negligent or improper manner, so as to cause harm to a 
third party, the master is responsible for the harm.”95 
 
The rationale for the employer’s liability is controversial. The risk or danger theory 
postulates that the work which is “entrusted to the employee creates certain risks of 
prejudice (the commission of delicts) for which the employer, on the grounds of 
fairness and justice, should be held liable as against prejudiced outsiders.”96 
 
There are three requirements for an employer to be vicariously liable for the delict of 
his employee: there must be an employer-employee relationship at the time of the 
commission of the delict, the employee must commit a delict causing loss to a third 
party, the employee must have been acting within the scope of his duties at the time 
that the delict was committed.97 
 
It may happen that an employee’s delictual conduct occurs while acting beyond the 
authority granted, not in furtherance of the employer’s interests, For such cases, the 
                                            
92 Ibid 578. 
93 Neethling (note 53 above; 312). 
94 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733. 
95 Feldman supra. 
96 Neethling (note 53 above; 312). 
97 Neethling (note 53 above; 313 & 314). 
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courts have developed the deviation rules. The courts will consider the degree of 
deviation to ascertain whether the employer may be vicariously liable. 
 
In the Grobler v Naspers Bpk98 case, the employee alleged that her employer had 
breached a legal duty, to its employees, to create and maintain a working 
environment in which, amongst other things, its employees were not sexually 
harassed by other employees in their working environment.99 The court decided that 
an employer may be held vicariously liable where the working relationship created a 
risk of harassment or enhanced such a risk, and that the harassment took place in 
the employment relationship.100 Therefore, employers may be held vicariously liable 
if there is a “sufficiently close connection between the wrongful acts of the perpetrator 
and the risk created by the enterprise.”101   
 
The sufficiently close connection test, as described in Grobler, is used in other legal 
jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand, and the UK.102 
 
In the context of social media, the sufficiently close connection test may find 
application in a South African workplace where, for example, an employee views or 
disseminates pornographic or racist material from a work area that is also occupied 
by other employees. Employers need to guard against cyber-liability arising from 
social media use by their employees.  
 
The employer and employee are jointly and severally liable for the delict and, though 
the victim has the option of pursuing a claim against the perpetrator, they often 
proceed against the employer because the latter has greater financial resources.  
 
The employer may be held vicariously liable on several grounds as a result of social 
media use by the employees. These grounds will be considered next.   
 
 
                                            
98 Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2001 (4) SA 938 LC. 
99 Grobler supra at para 64. 
100 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 564,580 at 579). 
101 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 564 & 580). 
102 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 752). 
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4.3 Defamation  
Defamation is the wrongful, intentional publication of words or behaviour concerning 
another person which has the effect of injuring his or her status, good name or 
reputation.103 To succeed in an action for defamation, it is required to show 
unlawfulness, intention, publication, and impairment of the reputation of the 
complainant. 
 
The publication requirement is satisfied if the words or conduct are made known or 
disclosed to at least one person, other than the plaintiff and the other person must be 
aware of the defamatory character or meaning of the words or conduct.104 Publication 
will take place on the internet when the defamatory statement is read, seen or heard, 
and understood by the receiver.105 
 
An employee’s liability for defamation may result in vicarious liability for the company. 
A court may find that, in providing an employee with ‘tools’ to access the internet and 
email facilities, the employer is directly liable as a publisher or disseminator of the 
offending statement.106   
 
Social media is a readily available tool for the dissemination of messages to an almost 
infinite number of people, it follows, therefore, that social media may be used to meet 
the ‘publication’ requirement that is necessary to prove defamatory conduct. 
Employers may be held vicariously liable where employees, acting in the course of 
his or her employment, post defamatory material or send defamatory 
communications via social media. 
 
The publication requirement will be met where, for example, a defamatory Facebook 
post is read and understood by any other person aside from the party defamed.  
 
In CWU v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd,107 an employee circulated emails in 
which he made allegations of corruption and bias against the employer’s 
                                            
103 Neethling (note 53 above; 280).  
104 Neethling (note 53 above; 281). 
105 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 756). 
106 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 757). 
107 CWU v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd 2003 (8) BLLR 741 (LC). 
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management. MTN charged the worker for having used company tools to send 
messages that exposed the employer to liability by its clients. The Labour Court found 
that the worker’s conduct in sending the emails exposed the employer to reputational 
damage and, further, it exposed the employer to potential vicarious liability claims. 
 
The risks to the employer, for being held vicariously liable for the defamatory social 
media posts of its employees, are real. The existence of these risks provides a sound 
reason to argue in favour of the monitoring of employees’ social media 
communications.   
 
4.4 Harassment and discrimination 
Where an employer does not take steps to prevent the circulation of sexually and/or 
racially offensive material, this will result in discrimination and intimidation in the 
workplace, which may result in vicarious liability for the employer.108 
 
The Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment cases defines 
harassment as conduct that is either, physical, verbal, or non-verbal. Item 4(1)(c) 
includes, as a form of non-verbal conduct, the “unwelcome display of sexually explicit 
pictures and objects.” Pornographic material can be directly or indirectly offensive. 
Directly is where the pornographic material may be attached to an electronic 
message and sent to co-workers, and indirectly where an uncomfortable working 
environment is created by employees downloading or viewing pornographic material 
at their workstations.109 In the Bamford v Energizer110 case, employees were 
dismissed for distributing pornography using the employer’s computer system in 
violation of a company rule that prohibited such conduct.111 The Arbitrator noted that 
while such conduct may be carried out in private, it could not be condoned in 
workplaces because employers could potentially be held vicariously liable for the 
offensive conduct of the perpetrators.112   
 
                                            
108 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 761). 
109 Etsebeth(note 89 above; 752). 
110 Bamford and Others v Energizer 2001 (12) BALR 1251 (P). 
111 Etsebeth (note 89 above; 760). 
112 V Etsebeth ‘The growing expansion of vicarious liability in the information age (Part 2)’ (2006, 
Journal of South African Law. 
35 
 
In Cronje v Toyota Marketing,113 the employee’s dismissal arose from his distribution 
of racist and/or inflammatory material, using a system that belonged to the company, 
while he was at work. The dismissal was upheld, and the CCMA remarked that the 
mail that was circulated was crude and offensive, and depicted black people as 
human beings of lesser intelligence and low morality. 
 
4.5 Breach of copyright 
Access to the world wide web114 provides everyone with the ability and opportunity 
to download articles, journals, songs, photographs and various other data. However, 
if an employee downloads material that is protected by copyright, and forwards it to 
another, this will constitute copyright infringement.115 
 
Copyright protection in South Africa is provided by the Copyright Act No. 98 of 1978. 
The law of copyright applies as equally in the real world as in cyberspace. 
Publications in electronic or digital forms (books, journals, magazines, and other 
forms of written publications) are protected in accordance with the law of copyright.116  
 
Therefore, if employees are granted access to the internet by a business 
organisation, copyright infringement becomes a risk and should become a concern 
for the company. 
 
4.6 Inadvertent formation of contracts 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, discussed in 
paragraph 6.2.4 below, provides that “an agreement is not without legal force and 
effect merely because it was concluded partly or in whole by means of data 
messages.”117 All contracts must comply with the common law requirements of 
consensus, contractual capacity, legality, the possibility of performance and the 
prescribed formalities.118 In terms of section 22, an agreement concluded between 
                                            
113 Cronje v Toyota Marketing 2001 (3) BALR 213 (CCMA). 
114 “Means an information browsing framework that allows a user to locate and access information 
stored on a remote computer and to follow references from one computer to related information on 
another computer “: Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No 25 of 2002, S1 (definitions).  
115 Etsebeth (note 112 above; 761). 
116 Etsebeth (note 112 above). 
117 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No 25 of 2002, section 22. 
118 Etsebeth (note 112 above; 763). 
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parties by means of data messages is concluded at the time and place where the 
acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror. Section 23(1)(b) provides that an 
offer will be deemed to have been received by the offeror when the complete data 
messages have infiltrated the information system of the offeror, and the offeror is able 
to retrieve or reproduce the data message.119  
 
An employee, who inadvertently forms a contract via electronic mail, with another 
company, binds the employer to the contract. “If a recipient of a document has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the person sending the document has the 
authority to offer and agree to the undertakings and statements contained therein, 
and accepts these unconditionally, then by law the contract is, in all likelihood, prima 
facie valid and enforceable.” 120 
 
Etsebeth121 holds the view that the most effective method for a company to guard 
against the inadvertent formation of contracts would be to implement content 
monitoring software. 
 
4.7 Productivity and efficiency  
Dancaster’s article122 relating to internet abuse within South African companies 
revealed that a significant number of employees engage, during work hours, in non-
work-related activities. More than two-thirds of the companies surveyed experienced 
‘cyberloafing’ by employees. Where employees use employer-provided facilities to 
engage in activities not related to work, it is easy to see that assigned work will not 
be carried out and there will be a resultant drop in productivity.  
 
The primary reasons for employers wanting to monitor internet and social media 
usage are to determine whether employees are surfing the internet instead of doing 
assigned work, whether employee activities are clogging the corporate network and 
                                            
119 Etsebeth (note 112 above). 
120 Etsebeth (note 112 above; 764). 
121 Etsebeth (note 112 above; 764). 
122 Dancaster (note 85 above; 862 & 872). 
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using up computer power needed for corporate activities, and whether company 
resources are being used excessively for personal gain.123 
 
Approximately one hundred and sixty Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed 
companies responded to the survey analysed by Dancaster and of these, 69% 
experienced employee internet loafing, 65% experienced degraded system 
performance, 70% found employees downloading and sending discriminatory and 
sexually offensive jokes and pictures. Of the different types of internet abuse 
mentioned, 84% of the respondent companies experienced at least one of the 
abuses.124  
 
Most respondent companies had taken steps to address the problem. The steps most 
frequently used by the companies were to screen or block sites that were not 
approved, implementing internet acceptable use policies (IAUP’s), monitoring 
employee’s internet and email usage, and disciplining employees for internet and 
email abuse.125  
 
The survey revealed that most companies were aware of the risks posed to the 
organisation if they allowed employees unrestricted internet and social media use. 
Consequently, most had implemented some form of acceptable internet use policy.    
 
4.8 Summary 
Allowing employees open and unmonitored access to a computer and social media 
facilities will, almost certainly, manifest itself in compromised productivity and 
compromised efficiency for the organisation and more importantly, as explained 
above, it leaves the organisation exposed to legal liability. On the other hand, 
excessive monitoring of employee activity may sow discord in the workplace, cause 
tensions in the employer and employee relationship, and will in equal measure 
contribute to decreased productivity and efficiency. How is a balance to be struck? 
 
                                            
123 Dancaster (note 85 above; 863). 
124 Dancaster (note 85 above; 866). 
125 Dancaster (note 85 above; 866). 
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The answer lies, in part, with section 23(1) of the Constitution.126 This provision reads 
“Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” The term ‘everyone’ is interpreted to 
include both the employer and employee. Analysis of the law in foreign jurisdictions 
shows that the courts have come to the aid of employers where employee abuse of 
social media and electronic communications has caused harm to an organisation. 
 
Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution reads “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law.” Foreign law, although not binding 
on courts and tribunals, nonetheless has persuasive authority. 
 
The next chapter discusses social media misconduct in the context of foreign law, 
and how it has been addressed in some of the leading democracies of the world. The 
discussion will include an analysis of the applicable laws, decided cases, and the 
contributions of academics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
126 Act 108 of 1996.   
39 
 
Chapter 5:  
Foreign Law 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Countries of the world exist in what is sometimes referred to as a global village. The 
main characteristic of a global village is that its members take advantage of the skills 
and expertise of fellow members, and they adopt international best practices. 
Advances in knowledge and practices in the fields of engineering, architecture, 
medical sciences, communications and other spheres of activity are often shared by 
members of the global village. 
 
South African law is not unaffected by developments outside of its borders and, as 
stated in the previous chapter, section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution permits judicial 
officials to take foreign law into consideration. 
 
South Africa enjoys relatively cordial relations with most countries of the world. The 
world’s nations, however, are not homogeneous in the relationships that exist 
between governments and their citizens, and not all countries emphasise the 
democratic values that are found in the South African Constitution.127   
 
This chapter will examine both the law and decided cases, relating to social media 
misconduct, in five countries: the USA, Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand. 
These countries have been chosen because they all have rich histories of having 
aspired to, or having fiercely protected, some of the fundamental rights reflected in 
South Africa’s Constitution.  
    
5.2 The USA 
5.2.1 Introduction – Public Sector Employee 
                                            
127 The preamble of Act 108 of 1996 contains provisions that reflect South Africa’s aspirations 
towards “establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights”. 
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The 1st and 4th amendments of the American Constitution128 are especially important 
for the purposes of this dissertation. The 1st amendment129 includes protection for 
freedom of speech, and the 4th amendment130 includes the protection of citizens’ 
privacy rights. The provisions of the American Constitution find application only in 
respect of relations between the government and public-sector employees. The 
constitutional provisions, though of persuasive value, find no application in private 
sector employer and employee relations. 
 
A private employer does not have a responsibility to respect an employee’s 1st 
Amendment rights (with a few exceptions, such as concerted speech related to 
working conditions, or speech relating to policy violations including discrimination or 
harassment).131 Aside from these exceptions, private sector employers have the right 
to tell employees not to talk about issues or not to undertake practices.132 
 
For public sector employees to invoke the 1st Amendment protection, their speech 
needs to meet a three-pronged test – first, the speech must touch on a matter of 
public concern; second, the speech must fall outside of the employee’s job duties; 
finally, the employee’s interest in free speech must outweigh the government’s 
interest in efficient and effective provision of services.133 
 
American courts, when considering 4th Amendment disputes, adopt a balancing test 
that looks at the employee’s privacy rights in relation to governmental interests – the 
reasonableness of a search, for work-related purposes, is an important 
consideration.134 
 
                                            
128 The Constitution of the United States, signed on 17th September 1787. The 1st and 4th amendments 
were signed in 1791. 
129 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. 
130 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized”.  
131 W Jacobson & S Tufts ‘To post or not to post: employee rights and social media’ (2014) 33(1) 
Review of Public Personnel Administration 84-107. 
132 Ibid at 91. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid at 93. 
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Employees’ off-duty conduct, which includes social media postings, can have a direct 
impact on the employment relationship. Where there is a connection between the 
behaviour and the efficiency of the public service, the off-duty conduct becomes 
subject to regulation and inspection.135 
 
5.2.2 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (‘ECPA’) 
ECPA was enacted by the US Congress to extend government restrictions on 
wiretaps to include transmissions of electronic data by computer. Title 1 is called the 
Wiretap Act,136 and it restricts interception of communications while in transit. Title 2 
is known as the Stored Communications Act137 and restricts the disclosure of 
communications stored on a server, or in the cloud. Title 3 is called the Pen Register 
Statute,138 and it restricts the government’s ability to obtain non-content information 
(such as a list of phone numbers dialled). 
 
The equivalent statutes in South Africa, which will be discussed below, are the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
Related Information Act 70 of 2002 for the Wiretap Act, and the Protection of Personal 
Information Act 4 of 2013 for the Stored Communications Act. 
 
The Wiretap Act places prohibitions on the interception or attempts to intercept wire 
or electronic communications, disclosing or attempting to disclose the intercepted 
communication, or using the content of the intercepted communication.139 It follows, 
therefore, that an employer who monitors or intercepts an employee’s electronic or 
social media communications, may be fined or imprisoned.140  While the Wiretap Act 
relates to communications in transit, the Stored Communications Act finds application 
where communications are in storage. 
 
There are important exceptions in ECPA. Employers may access the stored 
communications of employees who use the employer’s systems, the business 
                                            
135 Ibid. 
136 Title 1, Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C 2510-2522 
137 Title 2, Stored Communications Act ,18 U.S.C 2701-2712 
138 Title 3, Pen Registers and Track and Trap Devices Act, U.S.C 3121-3127 
139 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1). 
140 18 U.S.C. 2511 (4)(a). 
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extension exception allows employers to monitor employees’ communications made 
in the ordinary course of business, and employees may give consent to the employer 
to have their communications intercepted. In these cases, the employer may avoid 
liability under ECPA.141 
 
5.2.3 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)142  
The NLRA is a federal law that grants employees the right to form or join unions, and 
to engage in protected concerted activities.143 Concerted activities relate to employee 
conduct that addresses or strives towards improving their working conditions. The 
“National Labor Relations Board” (NLRB) is an agency created by the Federal 
Government to enforce the NLRA. 
 
The potential negative implications of social media have caused concern among 
employers. As a result, employers began to institute policies to address employee 
social media use and have included in their policies the nature of what employees 
are permitted to post. Some policies were deemed by the NLRB as being overbroad 
or having the effect of violating the rights of workers’ to engage in concerted 
activities.144 Concerted activities are those activities engaged in, with or on the 
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee 
himself.145 In the South African context, concerted activities are synonymous with 
trade union activities that enjoy protection under the Labour Relations Act. 
 
                                            
141 F J Cavico ‘Social media and the workplace: legal, ethical, and practical considerations for 
management’ (2013) 12 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization   
142 National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C 151-169 (2012). 
143 Section 7 reads: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and 
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right 
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) [section 158(a)(3)”. 
144 Ireton (note 11 above; 144-179). 
145 Ireton (note 11 above; 147).  
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Concerted activities are protected by section 8(1)(a)146 of the NLRA. To determine 
section 8 violations, the courts consider whether workplace rules “would reasonably 
tend to chill147 employees in exercising their Section 7 rights.”148  
 
Sections 7 and 8 protect employees who engage in protected concerted activity if 
they choose to communicate online, using social media.149 While section 7 protects 
employees’ collective criticism of their employer, employers may lawfully restrict their 
employees from making defamatory comments, or comments which are deliberately 
or maliciously false.150  
 
Most American private sector workers are employed on an “employment-at-will” 
basis, and they enjoy little job security. Under this doctrine, an employer can 
terminate an employee (unless the employee has a contract for a fixed term) at any 
time, for any reason, or no reason at all.151 The employment-at-will doctrine 
resembles South Africa’s common law approach to employment relations. The 
doctrine will not withstand constitutional and LRA scrutiny in South Africa where the 
emphasis is on ‘fair’ labour practises. 
 
In the USA, an employee may lawfully be dismissed for social media postings, except 
if the postings related to concerted activities. Employees enjoy protection if they are 
able to show a link between the postings and a legal doctrine (such as contained in 
the “Civil Rights Act of 1964,” “Age Discrimination in Employment Act” or the 
“Americans with Disabilities Act).”152 
 
5.2.4 Court decisions 
This sub-section concludes by looking at several American court decisions. In 
O’Connor v Ortega,153 the 4th Amendment privacy protection in the workplace was 
                                            
146 S8(a)(1) reads: (a) “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-- (1) to interfere with, restrain, 
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7”. 
147 The courts interpret “chill “to mean inducing a sense of caution and timidity. 
148 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998). 
149 Cavico (note 141 above).   
150Ireton (note 11 above; 144-179 at 149).  
151 A C McGinley & R P McGinley-Stempel ‘Beyond the water cooler: speech and the workplace in an 
era of social media’ (2012) 30(1) Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal 
152 Ireton (note 11 above; 144-179). 
153 O’Connor v Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
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considered. Hospital officials had conducted a search of the office of the employee 
(who was employed as a physician and psychiatrist) and removed items of a personal 
nature from his workstation and filing cabinets. These were subsequently used in a 
disciplinary hearing against the employee and led to his dismissal. The employee 
filed an action alleging that, in searching his office, the employer violated his 4th 
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court pronounced that the “operational realities of 
the workplace may make some public employees expectations of privacy 
unreasonable” and “the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.” Finally, the court said that 
government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of 
workplace rules – searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal 
in the private-employer context – do not violate the 4th Amendment. The US 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” closely 
resemble the words of the court in the South African case of Bernstein v Bester.154  
 
In Smyth v Pillsbury Co,155 the employee’s claim that his right to privacy was violated, 
when his emails were intercepted by the employer, was not accepted by the court. 
Smyth had sent threatening emails to his supervisor and was dismissed for his 
conduct. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
voluntary mail communications made through the company system.  
 
Five employees in Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc and Carlos Ortiz156 were fired for 
Facebook comments, purportedly for bullying a co-worker. The NLRB found that the 
employees’ postings fell “within the protection of section 7 of the NLRA. The action 
of an individual is concerted if its object is to induce group action.” The decision is 
important also because union membership is not a requirement to obtain NLRA 
protection.157 Similarly, in South Africa, union membership is not a requirement to 
enjoy the rights and protections of the LRA and other labour law. 
 
                                            
154 Bernstein .supra 
155 Smyth v Pillsbury Co 914 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa 1996). 
156 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. and Carlos Ortiz NLRB Case 03-CA-027872 Dec 2012. 
157 C N O’Brien ‘The top ten NLRB cases on facebook firings and employer social media policies’ 
(2014) 92(2) Oregon Law Review 337-353. 
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In Costco Wholesale Corp,158 the NLRB found the organisation’s social media policy 
(‘SMP’) problematic in that it was a violation of section 8(1)(a) of the NLRA as the 
provisions in the SMP were overboard and tended to ‘chill’ employees in the exercise 
of their section 7 rights.159 The NLRB instructed the employer to revise its social 
media policy. The approach of the NLRB is likely to be followed in South Africa where, 
for example, employers seek to prohibit employees from engaging in trade union 
activities via social media. 
 
The case of Karl Knauz Motors Inc160 involved an employee, a motor vehicle 
salesman, being dismissed for posts that he had made on Facebook. The employee 
posted comments in respect of the poor quality of food offered to potential buyers 
attending a new BMW launch. He complained that the poor hospitality would 
adversely affect car sales and that he would earn lower sales commissions. The 
employee posted pictures of the food offered (hot dogs and chips). He then also 
posted pictures of an accident that occurred at an adjoining Land Rover sales site, 
also owned by his employer. The NLRB held that segments of the employee 
handbook violated section 8(1)(a) of the NLRA, in that it tended to chill161 employees 
in the exercise of their statutory section 7 rights. However, the employee’s dismissal 
was found to be fair, as the dismissal was based on his unprotected Facebook 
postings relating to the Land Rover site accident. 
 
In Design Technology Group L.L.C d/b/a Bettie Page Clothing,162 the NLRB 
confirmed that employees who discuss their remuneration, their work hours and their 
work conditions on Facebook, are entitled to section 7 NLRA protection. In addition 
to ordering the reinstatement of the three dismissed workers, the NLRB ordered the 
employer to remove the workplace rule that forbade employees from disclosing their 
remuneration to fellow employees or from disclosing it to any other party. South 
African employers should similarly exercise caution and guard against including 
provisions in their social media policies that infringe the legitimate rights of 
employees. 
                                            
158 Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 NLRB, No. 106, 2012 WL.  
159 O’Brien (note 157 above). 
160 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 NLRB. No.164, 2012 WL 4482841 Sept 2012. 
161 Note 147 above. 
162 Design Technology Group., L.L.C., d/b/a Bettie Page Clothing, 359 NLRB No.96, 2013. 
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In concluding this section, it is noted that USA law protects both the interests of 
employers and employees. Section 7 and Section 8(1)(a) of the NLRA protects the 
interests of employees when they engage in social media activities aimed at 
advancing their collective interests.163 The interests of employers are given protection 
by the provisions of ECPA where employees’ communications may be accessed or 
monitored in certain circumstances.164 The significant difference between workplace 
law in the USA and South Africa is that, whereas the employment-at-will doctrine 
permits USA employers to dismiss workers without providing reasons,165 the LRA 
requires South African employers to justify employee dismissals by following a fair 
procedure and, in addition, providing a fair reason for the dismissal.166   
 
5.3 Canada 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Because of the geographical proximity of Canada to the USA, it may be expected 
that legal developments in the one country would influence similar developments in 
the other. Morgan167 writes that, in answer to the question of whether employers may 
legally monitor employee internet use, Canadian legal commentators have 
responded unequivocally: employers may monitor under any circumstances, as they 
see fit. The response seems to be based on two premises, both taken from American 
jurisprudence on the matter.168  However, as Morgan goes on to observe, “it will be 
imprudent to assume that Canadian Courts will follow American jurisprudence on the 
subject since significant differences exist between applicable American and 
Canadian privacy legislation.”169  
 
There are two important reasons. The first reason is that the judiciary and legislature 
in Canada are leaning towards a greater protection of individual rights. Further, 
judicial interpretation of privacy principles arising from the Canadian Charter indicates 
that employees may expect a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, 
                                            
163 Defamatory or malicious social media content are not protected. 
164 Cavico (note 141 above). 
165 McGinley (note 151 above). 
166 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188. 
167 C Morgan ‘Employer monitoring of employee electronic mail and internet use’ (1999) 44 McGill Law 
Journal 849-902. 
168 Ibid 849. 
169 Ibid. 
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and employer monitoring must be reasonable and performed in accordance with the 
employee’s consent.170 
 
5.3.2 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom  
Privacy protection is granted to citizens under section 8 of the Canadian Charter.171  
Although the provisions of the Charter apply only to government action, therefore, not 
being applicable in disputes between private parties, a number of Canadian Supreme 
Court decisions have left room for an indirect impact of the Canadian Charter on 
private disputes.172 In RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd,173 the Supreme Court held 
that “while the Canadian Charter does not apply to disputes between private parties, 
courts ought to apply and develop principles of common law in a manner consistent 
with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution.”174 
 
5.3.3 Federal and provincial privacy legislation  
The Federal structure of Canada has an impact on the legislative framework. In terms 
of the provisions of section 91 of the Constitution, the federal government is assigned 
jurisdiction over certain matters (such as the military, currency and coinage, banking, 
postal service); and further, in terms of section 92, the provincial legislatures may 
exclusively make laws, amongst others, in relation to municipal institutions in the 
province, shop and other licenses, property and civil rights within the province.175 
 
The resultant effect is that, in respect of privacy rights, the Federal Government has 
enacted legislation regarding matters falling within its core competency (such as 
banks, criminal law, Canada Post) and the provincial governments have enacted 
legislation in respect of their jurisdiction over matters concerning property and civil 
rights.176 
 
In the context of the workplace, employers who view the social media sites of 
employees, whether in the context of pre-employment screening or to obtain 
                                            
170 Ibid at 854. 
171 Section 8 reads: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure “. 
172 Morgan (note 167 above at 863). 
173 RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd 1986 (2) SCR 573. 
174 Morgan (note 167 above). 
175 Constitution Act 1867.  
176 Morgan (note 167 above at 873). 
48 
 
evidence of employee misconduct, may fall foul of federal or provincial privacy 
legislation. 
 
5.3.4 Court Decisions 
In R v Cole,177 the Supreme Court in Canada pronounced on the employees’ rights 
to privacy with work equipment. In answering whether Mr Cole had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his employer-provided laptop, the court held that (regardless 
of who owns the equipment) the personal information on computers enjoys the 
protection given by section 8 of the Canadian Charter. Personal information reveals 
details about a person’s private life to which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. However, the court ruled that the improperly obtained evidence by the 
employer was admissible, as the matter related to child pornography. The 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine, as applied in the USA in Ortega and in 
South Africa in Bernstein, is echoed in this Canadian Supreme Court decision. 
 
Lougheed Imports Ltd. (c.o.b. West Coast Mazda) (Re)178 involved two employees 
who were dismissed for making Facebook posts that contained offensive comments 
about their managers. The Labour Relations Board agreed with the employer’s 
contention that the Facebook posts constituted proper cause for termination of their 
employment. 
 
In Chatham-Kent (Municipality) National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and 
General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 127(Clarke Grievance),179 
Jessica Clarke was a caregiver at a home for the elderly. She created a blog, 
accessible to anyone with internet access, where she made inappropriate comments, 
published photographs, and posted confidential information about the residents 
entrusted to her care. In addition, she made disparaging remarks about her co-
workers and management. The employer dismissed Ms Clarke for a serious breach 
of confidentiality in circumstances where there was an elevated duty to ensure 
                                            
177 R v Cole 2012 SCC 53 (2012) 3 SCR 34. 
178 Lougheed Imports Ltd. (c.o.b. West Coast Mazda) (Re), (2010) B.C.L.R.B.D. No.190 (“Lougheed 
Imports “). 
179 Chatham-Kent (Municipality) v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General 
Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 127 (Clarke Grievance), (2007) O.L.A.A. No.135 
(“Chatham-Kent”). 
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privacy. The arbitrator agreed with the employer and deemed the employee’s 
dismissal fair. 
 
Airline pilot John Wyndels, in Wasaya Airways LP v Airline Pilots Assn., International 
(Wyndels Grievance),180 was dismissed for off-duty Facebook comments he made 
regarding the airline owners and passengers. The employer contended that the 
comments, although made off-duty, were derogatory and offensive, and harmed the 
airline’s reputation. The arbitrator found that the employee’s misconduct was such 
that it rendered the employment relationship untenable.  
 
In Teck Coal v U.M.W.A. Local 1656,181 Kyle Norman was dismissed by Teck Coal 
because he was often absent from work and had allegedly lied about the reasons for 
his absence. Norman was absent from work for 282 hours over a nine-month period. 
The average absenteeism rate for employees at the plant was 20 hours. The 
employee’s union argued that the dismissal was unfair, stating that Norman suffered 
from a mental disability which Teck was legally bound to accommodate. The 
arbitrator ruled that Norman’s dismissal was just and reasonable and that the Union 
was unable to establish that Teck had discriminated against Norman on the grounds 
of mental disability. 
 
In coming to his determination, the arbitrator referenced, among other things, that 
Norman announced on his Facebook page that he was “in the City, ready to party” 
when he had told Teck that he was unable to come to work. This announcement not 
only reduced the employee’s credibility but also pointed to his true emotional state.     
 
In the case of Re Walder,182 the British Columbia Employment Standards Tribunal 
(the ‘BCEST’), Rebecca Walder complained that the employer dismissed her 
because of her pregnancy and/or maternity leave. The BCEST found that Walder had 
been dismissed for just cause. The reason for the termination was that Walder had 
                                            
180 Wasaya Airways LP v Airline Pilots Assn., International (Wyndels Grievance), (2010) C.L.A.D., 
No.297, 195 L.A.C. (4TH) 1 (“Wasaya “). 
181 Teck Coal v U.M.W.A. Local 1656, (2010) A.W.L.D. 2589. 
182 Re Walder (2010) B.C.E.S.T.D. No.113. 
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posted, on a fellow employee’s Facebook page, an allegation that the other employee 
had stolen her job.  
 
It was observed above183 that the judicial and legislative trends in Canada show a 
leaning towards greater protection of individual rights, and that employees enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace. Employer monitoring must be 
reasonable and must be performed with the employee’s consent. Analysis of court 
decisions reveals that the Canadian courts have condoned the censuring, including 
dismissal, of employees who engage in malfeasant social media conduct that has the 
effect of causing harm to an organization, or which may sow discord in the workplace.   
 
5.4 The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand 
The chapter on foreign law concludes with a discussion of the law, insofar as it relates 
to misconduct in the workplace arising from social media usage, as it is applied in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 
5.4.1 The UK 
In the Copland v United Kingdom184 case, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) ruled that the United Kingdom had violated Article 8 of the ECHR185 for the 
manner in which they had monitored Ms Copland’s telephone calls, electronic mail 
and internet use.186 The Court ruled that, in the absence of a notification that 
communications may be monitored, the employee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of her communications. 
 
The Court referred to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000187 which sets 
out the circumstances in which employers may record or monitor an employee’s 
communications without the consent of the employee or other parties to the 
communication. In such circumstances, employers are required to give prior 
                                            
183 Supra note 166. 
184 Copland v United Kingdom (2007) ECHR 253. 
185 European Convention of Human Rights (1950). 
186 Ms Copland worked for Carmarthenshire College, a State administered body. The Deputy Principal 
of the College requested that Ms Copland’s telephone, internet, and email usage be monitored, to 
determine whether there was excessive personal use. The College did not, at the time, have a policy 
on the monitoring of employee communications. 
187  RIPA is an act which regulates the power of public bodies to carry out surveillance and 
investigation, including the interception of communications.  
51 
 
notification, to employees, that their communications may be intercepted.188   
However, the pronouncements189 of the court led certain legal commentators to hold 
the view that, in certain circumstances, employers may monitor employee 
communications. 
 
In the Smith v Trafford Housing Trust190 case, the employee was demoted for making 
known, on Facebook, his opposition on gay marriages. Mr Smith’s Facebook profile 
page identified him as a manager at the Trust. The employer held that readers would 
conclude that the Trust shared the employee’s anti-gay sentiments. The judge 
dismissed the employer’s argument. The court held that Mr Smith’s Facebook page 
was a personal web page, that no reasonable reader would conclude that the 
postings reflected the views of the Trust and that the identification of Smith’s 
employment at the Trust was in the context of personal information that appeared 
alongside other information such as his school, football team, and motor cars. The 
Smith case shows that, while workplace rules may restrict private social media use, 
such restrictions may not serve to negate the freedom of speech. The recent 
Cantamessa and Edcon Group191 decision in South Africa mirrors the findings of the 
UK court in this case.     
 
The House of Lords had to balance Naomi Campbell’s privacy rights, against a 
newspaper’s right to freedom of expression. The Mirror newspaper had published a 
series of articles relating to Ms Campbell’s drug addiction and her treatment.192 The 
Court considered Article 8 (privacy) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
ECHR. The court held by a majority, with two judges dissenting, that Campbell’s 
privacy rights trumped the Mirror’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
In conclusion, the Copland case illustrates the need, where an employer intends 
monitoring the communications of an employee, to first obtain the employee’s 
consent. In Smith, the court tempered the overzealous reaction of the employer who 
                                            
188 Copland supra at para 20. 
189 Copland supra para 48 where the court said “The Court would not exclude that the monitoring of 
an employee's use of a telephone, e-mail or internet at the place of work may be considered 
“necessary in a democratic society” in certain situations in pursuit of a legitimate aim ” 
190 Smith v Trafford Housing Trust (2012) EWHC 3221. 
191 Cantamessa and Edcon Group 2017 (38) ILJ 1909 (CCMA). 
192 Campbell v Mirror Group of Newspapers (2004) UKHL 22. 
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had demoted an employee because the latter had mentioned the name of his 
employer on his Facebook profile. The dissenting judgements in the Campbell case 
illustrate that there is, very often, an almost indistinguishable line that separates 
freedom of expression from the invasion of privacy.  
 
5.4.2 Australia 
The Fair Works Act 2009 governs workplace relations in Australia. The Fair Work 
Commission (‘FWC’) oversees adherence to the Act in Australian workplaces.  
 
In the Damian O’Keefe v William Muir’s (Pty) Ltd t/a Troy Williams The Good Guys193 
matter, the FWC upheld the employer’s dismissal of O’Keefe because the employee 
had made Facebook posts in which he threatened a manager. Although the 
comments were posted outside of work hours, they were viewed by co-workers, and 
the FWC held that the separation between home and work is now less pronounced 
than it once used to be.194 The dismissal was considered to be fair.195 
 
In Ms Tamicka Louise Dover-Ray v Real Insurance (Pty) Ltd,196 the employee posted 
a lengthy blog, on the social networking site, Myspace, in which she accused the 
employer’s management of corruption.197 The employee was dismissed primarily for 
the offensive blog which aimed to damage Real’s reputation.198 The FWC held that 
the employee’s conduct in publishing the blog was a valid reason for the termination 
of her employment.199 
 
In the Miss Sally-Ann Fitzgerald v Dianna Smith t/a Escape Hair Design200 matter, 
although the FWC found that the employee’s comments made on Facebook were not 
valid reasons for her dismissal,201 the FWC held that posting comments about an 
                                            
193 Damian O’Keefe v William Muir’s (Pty) Ltd t/a Troy Williams The Good Guys (2011) FWA 5311. 
194 Damian O’Keefe supra at para 43. 
195 Damian O’Keefe supra at para 49 where the FWC stated “while it is accepted that the applicant 
was frustrated by his unresolved pay issues, the manner in which he ultimately dealt with the issue 
warranted his dismissal for misconduct“.  
196 Ms Tamicka Louise Dover-Ray v. Real Insurance (Pty) Ltd (2010) FWA 8544. 
197 Ms Tamicka Louise Dover-Ray supra at para 22. 
198 Ms Tamicka Louise Dover-Ray supra at para 40. 
199 Ms Tamicka Louise Dover-Ray supra at para 62. 
200 Sally-Ann Fitzgerald v. Dianna Smith t/a Escape Hair Design (2010) FWA 7358. 
201 Sally-Ann Fitzgerald supra at para 66. 
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employer on a website (Facebook) that can be seen by an uncontrollable number of 
people is no longer a private matter but a public comment202 and also “it would be 
foolish of employees to think they may say as they wish on their Facebook page with 
total immunity from any consequences.”203 In Sedick and another and Krisray (Pty) 
Ltd,204 the CCMA was presented with similar facts and reached a decision similar to 
the FWC in the Sally-Ann matter. 
 
5.4.3 New Zealand 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights (‘NZBOR’)205 provides for the freedom of 
expression,206 but it makes no provision for privacy. The invasion of privacy forms 
part of the common law 207 and is protected by other means (such as trespass, 
defamation, breach of confidence, nuisance),208 and is implicitly protected by sections 
5 and 21 of the NZBOR.209 Invasion of privacy is actionable as a tort where 
information or material is published in respect of which the plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.210 The scope of privacy protection should not exceed such 
limits on the freedom of expression as is justified in a free and democratic society.211 
 
The Employment Relations Authority (ERA) that was established in terms of the 
Employment Relations Act212 helps to resolve employment-related problems.  
 
In Dandi Wang v New Zealand Chinese Television Ltd,213 the employee approached 
the ERA with a claim alleging her unfair dismissal by the employer. She confirmed 
that, after a dispute with her manager, she had published numerous abusive 
comments on social media site WeChat. The comments were viewable by co-
                                            
202 Sally-Ann Fitzgerald supra at para 50. 
203Sally-Ann Fitzgerald supra at para 52. 
204 Sedick & another and Krisray (Pty) Ltd 2011 (32) ILJ 752 (CCMA). See also Fredericks v Jo Barkett 
Fashion (2011) JOL 27923 (CCMA). 
205 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act No. 109 of 1990. 
206 Section 14 of NZBOR. 
207 K Evans ‘Hosking v runting balancing rights in a privacy tort’ (2004) 28 Privacy Law and Policy 
Reporter   
208 S Penk & R Tobin Privacy Law in New Zealand 2 ed (2016). 
209 Section 5 relates to limitations of rights, and Section 21 relates to unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
210 A Roos ‘Personal data protection in new zealand: lessons for south africa? (2008) 4 PER.  
211 Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1 32 (CA). 
212 Employment Relations Act No.24 of 2000. 
213 Dandi Wang v New Zealand Chinese Television Ltd (2015) NZERA Auckland 32. 
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workers.214 The ERA held that Ms Wang had not acted in good faith when she posted 
the communications on WeChat and that there was contributory fault by her. As a 
result, the remedies granted to her were reduced by 20%.215 
 
In Rachel Blylevens v Kidicorp Limited,216 the employee was charged with 
misconduct and subsequently dismissed for her Facebook comments. She 
maintained that she was exercising her right to freedom of speech when she posted 
adverse comments about her employer, and she ignored the employer’s request to 
remove the Facebook comments.217 The ERA concluded that Ms Blyleven’s 
dismissal was “within the range of appropriate responses available to a fair and 
reasonable employer.”218 Ms Blyleven’s unjustified dismissal claim failed. 
 
5.5 Summary 
Space constraints prevent analysis of how other foreign jurisdictions, aside from 
those discussed above; approach the matter of social media misconduct in the 
workplace. The matter of how the subject matter is handled by progressive countries 
in Europe, Asia, and Africa will make for informative reading.  
 
Social media misconduct cases are determined by courts and tribunals, in a particular 
jurisdiction, after having had regard for considerations that are unique to that specific 
jurisdiction. These considerations will include: is there a constitution and, if yes, does 
it apply vertically, or does it apply vertically and also horizontally?; does the Bill of 
Rights, if there is one, protect both privacy rights and freedom of expression or, does 
it protect only freedom of expression as in the NZBOR?; have laws been enacted 
that may have a bearing on the monitoring and interception of employee 
communications?; are there laws that govern the protection of informational privacy 
and, if yes, what is its impact on the workplace?; what is the jurisdiction’s approach 
to privacy and freedom of speech – is it a value enshrined in the constitution, or has 
it been developed by their common law, or is the approach a combination of both?; 
have labour laws been enacted to incorporate equity in labour relationships?   
                                            
214 Dandi Wang at para 18. 
215 Dandi Wang supra.  
216 Rachel Blylevens v. Kidicorp Limited (2014) NZERA Auckland 373. 
217 Rachel Blylevens supra at para 74. 
218 Rachel Blylevens supra at para 81. 
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From a South African perspective, reference to foreign court decisions may, very 
often, be of anecdotal value only. While the workplace conduct of employees in 
foreign jurisdictions may resemble that of their counterparts in South Africa, the final 
decisions of the courts and tribunals will be based entirely on the provisions and the 
developed law of their own unique legal system. The attention shifts, in the next 
chapter, to a discussion of how South Africa has dealt with social media misconduct 
in workplaces.  
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                                                 Chapter 6:  
Social Media Misconduct in South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In South Africa, the social media tsunami has had no less an impact than in any other 
country in the world. Between December 2000 and December 2017, the number of 
internet users in South Africa increased from 2,4 million to 30,8 million, and the 
country presently has over 16 million Facebook users.219 
 
The first part of this chapter will discuss the law in South Africa as it may be applied 
to social media misconduct in the workplace. Thereafter, there will be a discussion of 
legal decisions relating to the subject. 
 
6.2 South African Law relating to Social Media Misconduct in the Workplace  
 
6.2.1 The Constitution220  
The South African Constitution’s preamble provides that “We the people of South 
Africa …. adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic….”221 The 
supremacy of the Constitution is further confirmed in section 2 of the founding 
provisions.222  
 
The Bill of Rights (hereafter BOR) is part of Chapter 2 of the Constitution and it 
protects, amongst other rights, two rights which feature most often in disputes relating 
to social media misconduct in workplaces. These are privacy rights and freedom of 
expression rights.223  
 
                                            
219 Miniwatts Marketing Group: Internet World Stats available at http://www.internetworldstats.com, 
accessed on 12 January 2018.  
220 Act 108 of 1996.   
221 Act 108 of 1996.  
222 S2 reads “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it 
is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”   
223 The right to privacy is contained in S14 and the right to freedom of expression in S16. 
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The rights contained in the BOR apply both vertically and horizontally in terms of 
section 8 of the Constitution. Section 8(2) read with section 8(3)(b) provides the tool 
that is utilised to balance the rights of the employer and the rights of the employee.224  
 
Of paramount importance is section 36225 of the Bill of Rights, frequently called the 
‘limitations clause’ which provides that “fundamental rights and freedoms are not 
absolute, their boundaries are set by the rights of others, and by the legitimate needs 
of society.”226  Section 36, therefore, sets out specific criteria for the restriction of the 
fundamental rights in the BOR.227 Any infringement of a fundamental right is not 
unconstitutional where it can be justified by having regard for the criteria set out in 
section 36.  
 
For the purposes of social media misconduct in the workplace, infringements of 
employees’ and employers’ rights to privacy or freedom of expression may be 
justified in terms of section 36, in particular, the employee’s right to privacy or freedom 
of expression must be balanced with the employer’s business necessity or 
operational requirements.228   
 
In Moonsamy v The Mailhouse,229 the CCMA was required to pronounce on the 
admissibility of evidence that the employer had acquired by intercepting and 
recording the telephone calls of the employee, made at the employer’s premises, 
which the employer had, thereafter, used at the employee’s disciplinary hearing and 
which had contributed to the latter’s dismissal.230 The arbitrator, having decided that 
                                            
224 Collier (note 82 above). 
225 S36 reads: “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including   
 the nature of the right;  
 the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
 the nature and extent of the limitation;  
 the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
 less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit 
any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights 
226De Waal (note 35 above; 132). 
227De Waal (note 35 above). 
228 M McGregor ‘The right to privacy in the workplace: general case law and guidelines for using the 
internet and e-mail’ (2004) 16 South African Mercantile Law Journal 638,650. 
229 Moonsamy v The Mailhouse 1999 (20) ILJ 464 (CCMA). 
230 Collier (note 82above; 1751).  
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the employer’s conduct had infringed the employee’s privacy rights, sought to 
determine whether the employer’s conduct could be justified in terms of section 36.  
 
In considering the nature of the right, the arbitrator found that the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding telephone calls that he had made while 
at the employer’s premises.231 In respect of the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation, the arbitrator pointed out that while the employer “does have rights in 
respect of the workplace, there has to be a balancing of interests and the employee’s 
personal rights are to be preferred to the employer’s right to economic activity.”232 
Regarding the nature and the extent of the limitation the arbitrator found that, 
whereas the employer may inquire as to the number of calls an employee had made, 
there has to be prior authorisation or compelling reasons of business for the 
employee to be required to disclose the contents of the calls.233 The arbitrator found 
that in respect of the relation between the limitation and its purpose, the method of 
telephone tapping used by the employer was “excessively invasive” and could be 
justified only if it was shown that the interception of calls was the only method 
available to secure essential evidence.234 If less restrictive means were available, the 
employer should have used these. However, if telephone tapping was the only 
method available, then the employee’s prior consent needed to be obtained. 
 
The arbitrator held that the employer’s action in intercepting the employee’s 
telephone calls, without prior authorisation or consent of the employee, contravened 
section 14 read with section 36 of the Constitution, and the evidence was deemed 
inadmissible.235 
 
6.2.2 Labour Relations Act (‘LRA’)236 
The LRA is the foremost legislation regulating the relationship between employers 
and employees. The Act’s purpose is, inter alia, to give effect to and regulate the 
fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution.237 Section 3 of the Act 
                                            
231 Ibid at 1751.  
232 Ibid at 1752. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Moonsamy supra at 474. 
236 Act 66 of 1995. 
237 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 1(a). 
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provides that any person applying the LRA must interpret its provisions in compliance 
with the Constitution. The rights to equality, privacy, freedom of expression, freedom 
of assembly, demonstration, picket and petition, freedom of association, freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession and the labour relations rights are likely to be the 
most relevant.238 
 
Section 188 of the LRA provides that lawful dismissals may occur in three instances: 
when related to the employee’s conduct,239 when related to the employee’s 
capacity,240 and when related to the employer’s operational requirements.241 The 
employer bears the onus of proving that there was both substantive and procedural 
fairness.242 
 
Section 188(2)243 is important as it instructs that, when a person considers the 
fairness of a dismissal or the fairness of the procedure in effecting the dismissal, 
account must be taken of any relevant code of good practice which can be found in 
Schedule 8 of the LRA.244 
 
Section 7245 of Schedule 8 provides guidelines in cases of dismissals for misconduct. 
This section will be of importance in cases relating to social media misconduct in the 
workplace.  
 
                                            
238 Collier (note 82 above).  
239 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188(1)(a)(1). 
240 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188(1)(a)(1). 
241 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188(1)(a)(2). 
242 Collier (note 82 above) and see Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188(1)(b). 
243 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 188(2) reads: “Any person considering whether or not 
the reason for dismissal is a fair reason or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance 
with a fair procedure must take into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this 
Ac”t. 
244 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; schedule 8 is titled “Code of Good Practice: Dismissal “. 
245Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; section 7 reads: “Any person who is determining whether a 
dismissal for misconduct is unfair should consider(a) whether or not the employee contravened a rule 
or standard regulating conduct in, or of relevance to, the workplace; and 
(b) if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not- 
(i) the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
(ii) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been aware, of the rule 
or standard; 
(iii) the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; and 
(iv) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the rule or standard”. 
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The employer’s Social Media Policy (SMP) may be challenged on several grounds 
relating to the provisions of section 7 of the Code. A critical question that would be 
asked is whether the SMP contained any rule regulating the conduct of the employee. 
It stands to reason that if there was no workplace rule prohibiting the offensive 
conduct, then the employee’s dismissal may be challenged by claiming that the 
termination was effected on a non-existent and unknown rule.246 
 
If an SMP rule is invalid or unreasonable, the dismissed employee is likely to be 
granted relief. An invalid rule would be one where, for example, employees are 
prohibited from discussing working conditions and benefits on Facebook. An 
employee who had made Facebook posts in furtherance of trade union activity and 
was dismissed for that reason may institute a claim for an “automatically unfair 
dismissal” as provided for in sections 187(1) or S 187(1)(a) of the LRA.  
 
An unreasonable rule would be one where the company deems itself entitled to 
dismiss an employee, who had named the employer on a Facebook profile, and the 
company argues reputational damage as a fair reason to dismiss because the 
employee had made some controversial Facebook posts regarding non-work-related 
matters.247  
 
Automatically unfair dismissal claims may arise, in terms of section 187(1)(f) of the 
LRA, if employers unfairly discriminate against employees because of information 
obtained from the employee’s Facebook profile. 
 
6.2.3 Regulation of the Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related-Information Act 70 of 2002 (RICA)248 
RICA became operational at the end of September 2005.249 Before the enactment of 
RICA, the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act250 was the most important 
                                            
246 However, an employee’s dismissal has been deemed to be fair notwithstanding the fact that the 
employer had no workplace rule prohibiting the offensive conduct – refer Warren Thomas Griffith v 
VWSA 2000 CCMA case number EC16714.  
247  Smith supra is a UK decision. Cantamessa supra is a South African decision. 
248 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information 
Act 70 of 2002. 
249 T Pistorious ‘Monitoring, interception and big boss in the workplace: is the devil in the details?’ 
(2009) 1 PER. 
250 Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992.  
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statute regarding monitoring. The IMP Act was not applicable to private spheres, such 
as the workplace. The reach of RICA is wider than that of the IMP Act, as it applies 
also to the private spheres. 
 
Section 2251 of RICA is a core provision. Contravening the provisions of RICA is a 
criminal offence252 with severe penalties.253 
 
An understanding of indirect communications254 is important to this dissertation. 
Indirect communications include “telephone calls (landline and cellular), intranet, 
internet, facsimile facilities, private and personal email messages, SMS messages, 
tracking devices in company cars, and voicemail messages.”255  
 
The scope of section 2 is wide and aims to prevent interception of communications 
in any form; however, RICA makes allowance for the interception of communications 
in certain instances.256  
 
Section 4(1)257 makes allowance for consensual monitoring by parties to the 
communication. Parties to the communication include the sender, the receiver, or a 
party copied in. Some writers contend that the employer, as the owner of the 
equipment over which the message is relayed, is also a party to the communication. 
 
                                            
251 “Subject to this Act, no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept or authorise or 
procure any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, at any place in the Republic, any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission”. 
252 RICA Section 49. 
253 RICA Section 51 provides for a fine not exceeding R2 million or imprisonment not exceeding 10 
years. 
254 “means the transfer of information, including a message or any part of a message, whether 
(a) in the form of speech, music or other sounds; data, text, visual images, whether animated 
or not; signals; or radio frequency spectrum; or (b) in any other form or in any combination of 
forms, that is transmitted in whole or in part by means of a postal service or a telecommunication 
system”. 
255  Pistorious (note 249 above). 
256 Sections 3 to 11 set out the circumstances where there will be no contravention of S2. 
257 Section 4(1) reads: Any person, other than a law enforcement officer, may intercept any 
communication if he or she is a party to the communication unless such communication is intercepted 
by such person for purposes of committing an offence. 
62 
 
Section 5(1)258 is extremely important as it provides that any person may intercept 
any communication if one of the parties to the communication has given prior written 
consent to the interception.259 
 
A “general consent, contained in the conditions of employment of an employee, would 
amount to consent in terms of section 5(1). Some writers argue that on account of 
the words ‘consent in writing to such interception,’ consent may be required on a case 
by case basis.”260 Consent in writing needs to be given by only one party to the 
communication, whether it is the sender, the recipient, or a party copied in on the 
message. 
 
Section 6(1)261 of RICA relates directly to business enterprises. Section 6(2) sets out 
the requirements before any interception, in terms of section 6(1), is allowed – “the 
interception must be with the express or implied authority of the system controller, 
and the latter must have made reasonable efforts to inform users of the system of the 
intended interception; alternatively, the interception may take place with the express 
or implied consent of the users. The system must be for use in the business, and 
interceptions may be carried out for specific purposes (including investigating the 
unauthorised use of the system).”262  
 
Where employers have obtained the consent of employees to intercept 
communications or employers have made reasonable263 prior efforts to inform the 
users of the intended interceptions, then the provisions contained in RICA allow 
employers to lawfully monitor unsavoury employee conduct, such as cyberloafing, 
viewing of pornography, harassment, and sending of offensive emails. 
                                            
258 S5(1) reads: “Any person, other than a law enforcement officer, may intercept any communication 
if one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent in writing to such interception, unless 
such communication is intercepted by such person for purposes of committing an offence”. 
259 Pistorious (note 249 above).  
260 ibid. 
261 S6(1) reads: “Any person may, in the course of the carrying on of any business, intercept any 
indirect communication (a) by means of which a transaction is entered into in the course of that 
business; 
(b) which otherwise relates to that business; or 
(c) which otherwise takes place in the course of the carrying on of that business, in the course of its 
transmission over a telecommunication system”. 
262 Pistorious (note 249 above). 
263 Section 6(2)(d). 
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6.2.4 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act264 (ECTA)  
The objective265 of ECTA is to enable and facilitate electronic transactions and to 
create public confidence in electronic transacting.266  
 
Where the employer uses the electronic environment to convey information to 
employees, such as limitations on the use of computer equipment and networks, the 
use of a non-paper-based method of transmission should be viewed as natural and 
logical. Electronic agreements may be validly concluded through ‘click-wrap’ 
agreements where the employee signifies consent by clicking on the “I agree ‘icon.267 
  
In this manner, the employer will be able to comply with the RICA consent 
requirements. Consent to monitor and intercept employee communications would 
have been obtained electronically. The requirement of prior consent will be met with 
ease if the giving of such consent is conditional for obtaining access to the 
workstation or other telecommunication equipment.268 
 
6.2.5 Protection of Personal Information Act269 (POPI)   
The purpose of POPI is to promote the protection of data subjects’ personal 
information.270 Principally, the Act’s goal is to protect citizens’ constitutional right to 
privacy, by recognizing that the right to privacy includes a right to protection against 
the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and use of personal information.271   
 
Therefore, because POPI seeks to protect individual rights to privacy, there are 
significant implications for employers. The personal information272 of employees 
needs to be safeguarded, and the provisions of POPI complied with when such 
information is processed by employers. To ensure the safeguarding of personal 
                                            
264 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
265 S 2 of ECTA lists the objectives of the Act. 
266 Pistorious (note 249 above).  
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
270 D Millard & EG Baskaran ‘Employers’ statutory vicarious liability in terms of the protection of 
personal information act’ (2016) 19 PER/PELJ. 
271 LSwales ‘Protection of personal information: South Africa’s answer to the global phenomenon in 
the context of unsolicited electronic messages (spam)’ (2016) 49 SA Merc Law Journal at 49. 
272 See POPI, Chapter 1 for definition of personal information. 
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information by responsible parties (the employer in the present instance), personal 
information must be processed in a responsible and lawful manner.273 The Act 
provides employees with rights and remedies to protect their personal information 
from unlawful and irresponsible processing.274   
 
Chapter 3 of POPI275 imposes limitations on how employers may process personal 
information of employees. These conditions include: the need for lawfulness of 
processing, the limitations of processing, processing only on receipt of the 
employee’s consent, collection must be for a specific purpose, the limitations on the 
further processing of information, notification to the employee when collecting 
personal information, security safeguards to preserve the integrity and confidentiality 
of personal information, and prohibitions on the processing of special276 personal 
information.  
 
In an “organisation that consists of employers and employees, the employer will be 
held liable for contraventions of POPI by employees, because the employer is held 
to be the responsible party. Therefore, where the aggrieved party would traditionally 
have sued the employer for infringement of privacy based on the common law 
vicarious liability doctrine, there is now also the possibility to litigate based on the 
stipulations of POPI.”277  
 
In terms of section 99(1) of POPI, the data subject may institute civil action against 
an employer as the responsible party. Section 99(2) lists the limited defences which 
an employer may raise in an action brought in terms of section 99(1).278 
                                            
273 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, Section 4. 
274 POPI, Section 2(c). 
275 “Conditions for lawful processing of information”.  
276 Special personal information includes information relating to an individual’s religion, race, sexual 
orientation, trade union membership and political affiliation. 
277 Millard (note 270 above). 
278 S 99(1) “A data subject or, at the request of the data subject, the Regulator, may institute 
a civil action for damages in a court having jurisdiction against a responsible party for 
breach of any provision of this Act as referred to in section 73, whether or not there is 
intent or negligence on the part of the responsible party. (2) In the event of a breach the responsible 
party may raise any of the following defences against an action for damages:(a) Vis major;(b) 
consent of the plaintiff;(c) fault on the part of the plaintiff;(d) compliance was not reasonably practicable 
in the circumstances of the case; or(e)the Regulator has granted an exemption in terms of section 37”. 
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The defences are limited because the employer will not be able to escape statutory 
vicarious liability, for an employee’s misconduct, even if reasonable steps had been 
taken to prevent the employee from contravening POPI.279  
 
Employees may be guilty of misconduct if, in their use of social media platforms, they 
reveal personal information relating to co-workers to outside parties not entitled to 
the information.  
 
6.2.6 Analysis of South African legal decisions 
This section analyses important decisions that relate to social media misconduct in 
the workplace. 
 
In Goosen v Caroline’s Yoghurt Parlour (Pty) Ltd,280 the court considered the 
admissibility of transcripts of telephone conversations, which Goosen had acquired 
without his employer’s consent, and which he claimed showed bias on the part of the 
presiding officer at his disciplinary hearing. The Industrial Court ruled that the 
recordings were admissible. The court held that it should not be concerned with how 
the evidence was obtained, provided it was relevant and not obtained under duress, 
and there was no obligation on the accused to give self-incriminating evidence.281  
 
The Protea Technology Ltd and another v Wainer and others282 case was decided 
under the final Constitution. The employer had recorded conversations of the 
employee, without the latter’s consent, and tendered the recordings in court to prove 
that the employee had breached a restraint of trade agreement. The employee 
claimed that the employer had breached his right to privacy in making the recordings 
and that the evidence should not be admitted. The court ruled that, regarding the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, the “common law rule of relevance 
(applied in Goosen) was inconsistent with the Constitution, rather, the discretion must 
be exercised with regard to the substance of section 36(1) of the Constitution.”283 
Regarding the employee’s right to privacy, the court held that the right requires a 
                                            
279Millard (note 270 above).  
280 Goosen v. Caroline’s Yoghurt Parlour (Pty) Ltd and another 1995 (16) ILJ 396 (IC). 
281 Collier (note 82 above). 
282 Protea Technology Ltd and another v Wainer and others 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (W). 
283Collier (note 82 above). 
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subjective expectation of privacy which society considers objectively reasonable.284 
The court noted that the recorded calls were made during business hours, from the 
employer’s premises, and employee conversations relating to employer affairs were 
not private; further, the employer had a right to know whether the employee was 
committing a delict.The court concluded that Wainer was not entitled to insist on his 
right to constitutional protection of privacy and upheld the discretion of the court to 
admit illegally obtained evidence.285   
 
In Moonsamy v The Mailhouse,286 the CCMA considered the admissibility of illegally 
obtained evidence. The employer had, without Moonsamy’s authority, intercepted 
and recorded the employee’s telephone conversations, which were made from the 
employer’s premises, and the evidence obtained was relied on to dismiss the 
employee. The arbitrator held that the common law formulation of admitting illegally 
obtained evidence if it was relevant, was contrary to the right to privacy contained in 
the Constitution. The arbitrator found that the employee’s privacy rights were 
infringed and, in the light of section 36 of the Constitution, the infringement could not 
be justified because the employer had admitted that he had already secured evidence 
in other ways, without having had to infringe the employee’s privacy rights. The 
evidence was therefore deemed inadmissible.  
 
In the Bamford and others v Energizer (SA) Ltd287 matter, employees were dismissed 
for downloading and distributing pornographic and other non-work-related material 
during working hours, while using the employer’s facilities. The arbitrator upheld the 
dismissals, remarking that even though the employer did not have in place a 
computer usage policy, business equipment should legitimately be used only for 
business purposes. Any tolerance allowed by the employer should be used 
circumspectly. 
 
The Cronje v Toyota Manufacturing288 matter relates to the dismissal of managerial 
staff for publishing racist and inflammatory material via email and hard copy, and for 
                                            
284 Ibid at 1750. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Moonsamy supra. 
287 Bamford supra. 
288 Cronje supra. 
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having violated the company’s internet code. The material distributed was crude, 
offensive, and racially stereotyping. The arbitrator placed emphasis on the context in 
which the misdemeanour took place. The incident occurred in a factory that employed 
3500 Black employees, and where money and time was spent on building a good 
relationship between management and labour. The commissioner considered the 
existence of the rule prohibiting the conduct, the consistent application of the rule and 
the dismissed employee’s knowledge thereof and decided that dismissal was the 
appropriate sanction. 
 
Sedick and another and Krisray (Pty) Ltd289 relates to derogatory Facebook 
comments in respect of the employer, posted by employees, which had the potential 
to cause reputational damage to the organisation. In this matter, the employees did 
not expressly name the company, but the references were clear. The admissibility of 
evidence was not in dispute, as the employees had not put access restrictions on 
their Facebook profiles, and anyone could see the posts. The commissioner ruled 
that, in not making use of their privacy options, the employees had abandoned their 
rights to privacy. The CCMA ruled that dismissal was justified. 
 
Smith and Partners in Sexual Health (Non-Profit)290 considered the right of the 
employer to access the employee’s private internet-based Gmail account. The 
employer had initially accessed the employee’s private account accidentally and, 
thereafter, accessed the account intentionally. The CCMA ruled that, in intentionally 
accessing the private account after the accidental accessing of the account, the 
employee’s privacy rights were infringed, the evidence obtained was inadmissible, 
and the employee’s dismissal was deemed to be unfair. 
                                            
289 Sedick & another and Krisray (Pty) Ltd 2011 (32) ILJ 752 (CCMA). See also Fredericks v Jo Barkett 
Fashion (2011) JOL 27923 (CCMA). In Kendrick and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 2018 
(39) ILJ 2383 (CCMA), the employee was dismissed for making disparaging remarks about the Muslim 
community- the remarks appeared on social media. Dheaneswar and Trimedia 2016 (37) ILJ 273 
CCMA, relates to an employee receiving inappropriate WhatsApp text messages from her manager. 
The employee resigned after three weeks of employment and thereafter successfully pursued a 
constructive dismissal claim - she was awarded compensation in respect of what the arbitrator called 
the “predatory” behaviour of the manager. In Du Plessis and Rickjon Mining and Engineering 2018 
(39) ILJ 1665 (CCMA) the arbitrator considered the effect of derogatory remarks on Facebook, about 
a female employee, that were posted by the employee’s co-workers. The arbitrator held that such 
conduct constitutes harassment and was forbidden by the Employment Equity Act. The employer 
failed to take action against the perpetrators and had to pay the employee compensation.  
290 Smith and Partners in Sexual Health (Non-Profit) 2011 (32) ILJ 1470 (CCMA). 
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In Cantamessa and Edcon Group,291 the employer claimed that the employee’s 
Facebook post, made outside of working hours, tarnished its name and caused it 
reputational damage. The employee had linked herself, to the employer, by 
mentioning on her Facebook profile that she was employed at Edcon. The employee 
was dismissed for making racist and derogatory comments in her Facebook post. 
The CCMA found that the employer’s “social media policy did not regulate the use of 
social media outside of the workplace,”292 the employee merely stated her occupation 
as a fact about herself and, as such, it did not constitute a link to the employer such 
that she could be “disciplined for conduct outside of working hours.”293 The 
employee’s dismissal was deemed to be unfair. The facts of this case and the 
decision handed down are similar to the Smith294 case decided in the UK.  
 
Experian South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Haynes and another295 related to an employee’s 
use of Linked-In within the context of a restraint of trade dispute. The employee’s 
Linked-In profile mentioned the employee’s tasks with his former employer, it also 
showed that after joining his new employer, the employee met with clients of the 
former employer, and the Linked-In profile also showed the employee contacting 
Experian’s clients. The court held that because of the employee having contacted 
clients of his former employer via his Linked-In profile, the former employer was 
entitled to the relief it sought.296  
 
In Beaurain v Martin NO and others,297 the court considered whether publication on 
Facebook is a protected disclosure in terms of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 
2000 (PDA). The employee published photographs and complaints about his 
employer (Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town) on Facebook and when asked by 
the employer to stop, the employee claimed that his disclosures were protected by 
the PDA and that he was a whistleblower. The employee refused to heed the 
instructions of the employer and was dismissed for gross insubordination. The court 
held that an objective of the PDA is to allow employees to disclose improprieties of 
                                            
291 Cantamessa supra. 
292 Ibid  
293 ibid 
294 Smith supra. 
295 Experian South Africa (Pty) Ltd v. Haynes & another 2013 (1) SA 135 (GSJ). 
296 Experian supra at para 55. 
297 Beaurain v Martin NO and others 2014 (35) ILJ 2443 (LC). 
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the employer in a reasonable manner. The court held further that the “publication of 
the allegations on Facebook was unlikely to solve the problem, and it was 
unnecessary to publish the information to the international community, who could do 
little to help.”298 The court ruled that the employee had contravened express rules of 
the employer, despite being instructed twice to cease his Facebook publications, and 
he was dismissed for a fair reason. 
 
6.3 Summary 
In concluding this section on social media misconduct in South Africa, it is appropriate 
to reflect on a statement made earlier in this presentation. South Africa is a member 
of the global community and, notwithstanding its unique history and independence; it 
will readily adopt international best practices, as displayed in specialised fields such 
as industries and engineering and, to no less an extent, in the field of law. 
 
The next chapter will draw a comparison, between South Africa and other leading 
nations of the global community, and it will relate to their respective legal approaches 
toward social media misconduct in the workplace. Similarities and differences will be 
considered, with the aim of presenting proposals on how best to address the subject 
in the South African workplace.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
298 Beaurain supra at para 33. 
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                                                        Chapter 7:  
Concluding Comments: 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The use of internet-based communication tools is indispensable for the modern-day 
employer. However, granting employees limitless and uncontrolled access to 
communication facilities poses serious risks to the employer.  
 
There is, on the one hand, the employer who seeks to maximise profits, primarily 
from the efforts of a productive and content workforce. A disgruntled labour force is 
unlikely to be productive. The employer’s perspective must, of necessity, be wider 
than the pure monitoring of employees work efficiencies or their non-compliance with 
contract terms or company rules. The greater risk lies in the fact that, because of 
employee misconduct, the employer is exposed to the risk of incurring huge financial 
losses (for example, through vicarious liability, reputational damage, or lower 
productivity). 
 
Employees, on the other hand, are always conscious of their subordinate status to 
the employer and are resentful of working in claustrophobic environments where they 
perceive that their every action is seemingly subject to employer monitoring. They 
yearn for decent working conditions and respect for their common law, statutory and 
constitutionally entrenched rights.  
 
How best to balance the conflicting interests of employers and their employees, in 
the relatively new area of social media and internet-based communications, has been 
the subject of much discussion and debate.  
 
7.2 Present-day status of social media misconduct in workplaces 
The discussion in the earlier chapters has shown that, notwithstanding their being 
members of a global community of nations, the legal systems of individual countries 
differ considerably; for example: some countries may have constitutions, while others 
do not; where constitutions exist, these may operate vertically, or both vertically and 
horizontally; labour legislation may strive for equitable outcomes, while others may 
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not. A homogeneous legal system that is common to all member states does not 
exist. 
 
South Africa has drafted its Constitution having regard for its own turbulent history 
but, at the same time, acknowledging its membership in the world community. The 
Constitution acknowledges the need to abide by international law, it respects foreign 
law in allowing courts and tribunals to refer to such law, and fairness in labour 
practices is entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Context is a paramount consideration when courts and tribunals apply the law in 
South Africa. This is deemed necessary by the Constitution which provides that there 
must be recognition of the injustices of the country’s past and efforts must be made 
to heal divisions in an effort toward establishing a “society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental rights.” The cause of social media misconduct 
frequently arises from the deep-rooted societal divisions that continue to bedevil the 
country, and which give rise to beliefs of, for example, racial and gender superiority. 
This dissertation commenced with the view that astute industrial practitioners must 
be cognisant of the root causes of maladaptive behaviours in individuals and, in 
respect of the multi-racial and multi-cultural characteristic of the workplace, they must 
take steps to avert conflict arising from the existence of subliminal prejudices. The 
Cronje case is an example of an employer being aware of the harm that may be 
caused to an organisation with a multi-cultural workforce through the dissemination 
of racially prejudiced social media material. Deep-seated bigotry and racial prejudice 
often makes its way into the public domain through social media usage, both within 
and outside the workplace, and such conduct serves to impair the dignity of citizens 
and co-workers. Conduct that impairs the dignity of another person will be deemed 
unlawful in terms of section 10 of the Bill of Rights, and members of the workforce 
may justifiably be dismissed for social media conduct that impairs the dignity of 
others.  
 
The right to privacy, which includes the right not to have the privacy of one’s 
communications infringed, is protected in section 14 of the Bill of Rights. Freedom of 
expression is protected in section 16 of the Bill of Rights. These fundamental rights 
may, however, be restricted by section 36 of the Constitution which provides for the 
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limitation of rights in certain circumstances. Employees have not been able to 
successfully argue that their right to freedom of expression was infringed where, for 
example, they posted derogatory or defamatory comments about co-workers or 
management on social media sites. 
 
An individual’s right to privacy is protected in South Africa by the common law, the 
Constitution and legislation (including RICA, ECTA and POPI). Privacy rights are 
recognised, locally and globally, as being one of the most important of human rights. 
The House of Lords has records of a privacy dispute having been considered, in 
Peter Semayne v Richard Gresham,299 as long ago as 1604. The courts and the 
legislatures, both locally and internationally, have recognised that unrestricted 
employee privacy rights in the workplace may endanger the wellbeing of the 
business, and court decisions and legislation offer a measure of protection for 
employer rights. 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa recognised in the Bernstein matter that the 
“right to privacy is not absolute.” The right to privacy extends only to those “aspects 
of an individual’s life in respect of which the individual has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy” that is subjectively experienced and which society views as being objectively 
reasonable. As a person moves more into the public domain, including the workplace, 
the right to privacy diminishes. Legislation such RICA, ECTA, and POPI provide 
employers with lawful means to monitor their employees’ communications, when 
such monitoring is undertaken for business purposes, thereby allowing for the 
infringement of the privacy rights of workers. 
 
The potential for harm to business organisations, arising from social media or internet 
misconduct of employees, is vast. Decreased productivity, vicarious liability, liability 
for the unauthorised formation of contracts, liability for sexual harassment and 
discrimination are a few of the pitfalls that lie in wait for employers who do not monitor 
the social media and internet conduct of their employees. 
 
                                            
299 Peter Semayne v Richard Gresham (1604), 77 E.R. 194, (1588-1774) ALL E.R. Rep 62. 
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The analysis of cases and legislation relating to social media misconduct in foreign 
jurisdictions reveals two interesting phenomena. While the nature of the employee 
misconduct (such as defamatory social media posts, sexual and other forms of 
harassment, excessive private use) is largely the same throughout the world, the laws 
that are used to adjudicate social media misconduct disputes are different in each 
jurisdiction. South Africa’s Constitution, for example, provides for the protection of a 
range of rights, including privacy and freedom of expression, and further, these rights 
operate both vertically and horizontally. The US Constitution protects freedom of 
speech and privacy rights, but it operates only vertically, that is, between the 
government and public-sector employees. Therefore, except to be of persuasive 
value, the American Constitution does not apply in private sector disputes. In the 
USA, the Wiretap Act (Title 1 of ECPA) protects against the interception of 
communications during transmission, the Stored Communications Act (Title 2 of 
ECPA) restricts the disclosure of information stored on a server. An employer may 
avoid liability under ECPA if interception of employee communications arose out of 
business necessity, or if the employee consented to such interception. The provisions 
of the Wiretap Act resemble those found in South Africa’s RICA and the Stored 
Communications Act have similar provisions to those found in South Africa’s POPI.  
 
The ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine that underpins most employment relations in the 
USA, which allows the employer to terminate employment relationships at any time 
without having to provide reasons, contrasts starkly with South Africa’s LRA where a 
fair reason for any dismissal needs to be provided by the employer.     
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, like the American Constitution, 
operates vertically but has only persuasive value in private sector disputes. The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights makes provision for freedom of expression, but not for privacy. 
 
South Africa, similar to the foreign jurisdictions discussed above, does not have 
legislation relating specifically to social media misconduct. However, South African 
courts have made pronouncements on social media misconduct in the workplace by 
considering the values enshrined in the Constitution and related legislation such as 
RICA and ECTA, and by reference to the common law. Judicial officials have heeded 
section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution and have frequently referred to foreign law when 
74 
 
considering and handing down their decisions. The legislature, in promulgating laws, 
such as RICA and POPI which largely replicate provisions contained in foreign 
legislation, have also heeded section 39(1)(c). 
 
Business entities, both in South Africa and in other countries of the world, have begun 
implementing Social Media Policies (SMP’s) to guard against the risks posed by 
employee social media misconduct. The most important component of an SMP is to 
obtain the consent of the employee to allow monitoring, by the employer, of the 
employee’s communications.    
 
The next section considers the contents of SMP’s and their implementation.  
 
7.3 Social Media Policies (SMP) 
In the early years of social media, employers adopted a laissez-faire approach, 
adopting a minimalist interference stance. However, as the risks attached to social 
media misconduct became apparent, employers began introducing SMP’s in the 
workplace. 
 
It is submitted that the commentators and academics are correct regarding the 
provisions that need to be included in SMP’s. These provisions, which safeguard both 
employers and employees interests in equal measure, and which will contribute to 
workplace harmony, include the following:  
 
- It is necessary to reach agreement on the contents of SMP’s, with employees or 
their unions, before implementing any SMP’s. 
 
- The SMP must not contain provisions that violate the rights of employees, for 
example, prohibiting employees from canvassing co-workers to join a union.  
 
- Occasional private use of facilities, by employees, should be permitted. The SMP 
should outline the circumstances under which private use is allowed (for example, 
private use is allowed during lunch breaks, or before commencement and after 
completion of the work day). 
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- Remind employees that their usage of company communication systems will be 
monitored to identify any unauthorised, malicious, or criminal use thereof. 
 
- Private use must be lawful, ethical, and considerate of the rights of others.   
 
- Employee usage must not serve to expose the employer to any form of legal 
liability – the types of conduct must be outlined, and explained, in the SMP 
(explicitly state that employees may not engage in copyright infringements, make 
defamatory statements, view or download pornographic material, engage in 
cyberbullying or harassment, etc…).  
 
- When posting personal comments, employees must explicitly state that it is their 
views that are being expressed and not those of the employer. 
 
- The consequences of failing to adhere to the company’s SMP, including the 
sanctions that may be imposed on errant employees, must be stated 
unambiguously. 
 
- The management representative responsible for the company’s SMP must be 
identified in the SMP. 
 
- Staff training and refresher courses on social media matters must be carried out 
at reasonable intervals. 
 
The employee’s prior consent, to allow monitoring of their social media and internet 
use, grants the employer the “right not only to invade the employee’s privacy in 
certain circumstances but also to dismiss or discipline the employee for inappropriate 
use of communication tools.”300 
 
                                            
300 Collier (note 82 above). 
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“If the employment relationship is to be based on trust and its sensitivities respected, 
employers should be hesitant to monitor communication content, particularly without 
employee consent.”301  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
It is an accepted fact that it is only a small proportion of the workforce that are guilty 
of abusing social media, and employers are correct in taking steps to protect their 
own interests and the interests of other employees. Draconian measures to cull social 
media use, imposed by employers, will benefit neither themselves nor their 
employees. Measures to curb social media misconduct must be rooted in the 
Constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom and the other rights 
contained in our Bill of Rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
301 Collier (note 82 above). 
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